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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
‘[A]mongst the effects [of the Black-Scholes option pricing model] was to shift 
patterns of option prices towards the model.’ (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 3) 
 
Most financial models are based on the assumption that markets are complete and the classical 
example of a complete market is the setting of the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model.  In 
a complete market, the payoff of any asset can be perfectly replicated with the existing other 
assets without any frictions; in other words, there exists a market for every asset. The Black-
Scholes (1973) model is one of the most important developments of modern finance, but, 
despite the model’s popularity and importance, the complete market assumption remains 
unattainable for some applications. In reality, most markets can be described as incomplete, at 
least at certain points in time.  
 
My dissertation revolves around the idea of incomplete markets. Björk (2009) defines an 
incomplete market as a market where there are more sources of randomness than traded assets 
(except for the risk free asset). This means that there is a shortage of traded assets for some 
states of the world. Consequently, it is impossible to trade one asset for every state of the world 
to ensure against all future risks. There are several situations in which a market becomes 
incomplete: if the price of certain assets exhibits features like jumps or stochastic volatility, if we 
are confronted with transaction costs or portfolio constraints, or if there exist non-traded or 
infrequently traded assets. I focus on incompleteness which arises due to some of the assets in 
the market being either non-traded or infrequently traded.  
 
There are two direct consequences of market incompleteness. First, not all risks can be perfectly 
traded and hedged in the financial markets. Second, the price of a generic claim is no longer 
unique. For a market to not have any arbitrage opportunities, the number of traded assets must 
be small compared to the number of sources of risk, whereas for a market to be complete, the 
number of traded assets must be large compared to the number of sources of risk. Consequently, 
the only way for a market to be complete and not present any arbitrage opportunities is if the 
number of traded assets is exactly equal to the number of sources of risk. This means that, in a 
complete market, there is only one price system for the price of a claim. Solving this system will 
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lead to a unique solution, hence a unique price for the claim. However, once the market becomes 
incomplete and is comprised of less traded assets than sources of risk, there will be several 
different price systems for the price of the claim. All these systems will be consistent with 
absence of arbitrage, but not sufficient to arrive at a unique price.  
 
The studies in this dissertation can be placed in the general framework of incomplete markets. 
The first instance of market incompleteness that I deal with is that of contingent claims, for 
instance options written on non-traded or infrequently traded assets. In Chapter 2, I investigate 
what changes must be made to the traditional pricing mechanism when the underlying asset of 
the option is either non-traded or infrequently traded. Traditional option pricing is represented 
by the Black-Scholes (1973) model, where the price of the option is established by means of a 
riskless replicating portfolio whose instantaneous return must be equal to the return of a 
riskless asset. However, the replicating portfolio exists only if the underlying asset can be 
continuously traded. In the current market setting, the underlying does not satisfy this 
condition, which means that the option valuation based on replication arguments is no longer 
possible.  
 
I show in my analysis how to derive analytical formulas for European and perpetual American 
call options written on non-traded or infrequently traded assets. Given that the market is 
incomplete, the option price is not unique, but the set of possible prices can be restricted. My 
approach to narrowing the price interval is to restrict the volatility of the stochastic discount 
factor. This results in modified Black-Scholes (1973) closed-form solutions for an upper and a 
lower bound of the price of the call option. I find that, contrary to standard option pricing theory, 
the prices do not always display an increasing pattern when the volatility of the underlying asset 
increases. In fact, I show that the lower bound prices can decrease in response to an increase in 
the volatility of the underlying asset, when the underlying is either infrequently traded or non-
traded.  
 
The main contribution of Chapter 2 is to bring forward this inverse relationship between the 
option value and the volatility of the underlying, as well as the potential for early exercise at the 
lower bound even for an American call option on a non-dividend paying asset when the market 
is incomplete. At the lower bound, the option value decreases as the volatility of the underlying 
asset increases, forcing the economic agent to exercise his option early for fear that, if he 
continues to wait, he might lose the entire value of the claim.  
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A potential application for the pricing mechanism described in Chapter 2 is the valuation of real 
options. Real options are investments in non-financial assets like land, buildings, even oil 
concessions or mines. We can think of land as a real option. Titman (1985) put forward the idea 
of pricing vacant land as a European call option on a building that could potentially be built on 
that land. The underlying asset of such an option is the building, the strike price is the 
construction cost and the exercise time is at the start of the development. Titman’s (1985) main 
assumptions are that the market on which the real option exists is frictionless and that the price 
of the option can be calculated by means of replicating arguments. But buildings are infrequently 
traded assets. Even if at some point in time we observe a trade for a particular property, the 
same property might never be traded again or, at best, it will be traded at large intervals of time. 
Furthermore, each property is unique and it is therefore impossible to trade multiple 
homogeneous units of a building the way we do with liquid assets like stocks. Within this 
framework, we do not have the possibility to price the real option with the Black-Scholes (1973) 
option pricing formula. However, the good-deal bounds valuation technique can price this real 
option, provided that there exists a traded asset correlated with the underlying, for instance a 
REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust).  
 
It is often the case that real options theory is used to turn a negative NPV project into a positive 
NPV project, where the total NPV of a project is the sum of the traditional NPV value and the real 
option value. This can indeed happen if we apply the Black-Scholes (1973) formula in any setting 
disregarding whether or not the main assumptions are satisfied, given that higher volatility of 
the underlying asset in the formula automatically leads to a higher price. Chapter 2 shows that in 
an incomplete market setting, the price of the real option can actually decrease with an increase 
in the volatility of the underlying asset, meaning that investors can take a more conservative 
approach to pricing and avoid overestimating the value of an asset.  
 
The second case of market incompleteness that I explore in my dissertation is the problem of 
pricing very long-dated cash flows. The longest maturities for government bonds traded in the 
market are usually 25 or 30 years, meaning that if we want to value cash flows with maturities 
longer than 30 years we are again in an incomplete market situation due to the presence of non-
traded assets.  
 
In Chapter 3, I investigate how the market implicitly prices very long-dated cash-flows. I look at 
the prices of UK infinite maturity bonds, which were first issued in the 18th century. Some of 
them are still traded today. I compute theoretical prices for these bonds and show that they are a 
cheap investment, because they are generally underpriced. The results show that the mispricing 
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is mainly driven by volatility in financial markets and not by expectations of the economic 
outlook as one might think. 
 
Such problems are important to investigate, because they could reveal valuable information 
about what the term structure of interest rates should look like beyond traded maturities. The 
market prices of the UK infinite maturity bonds imply a constant discount rate beyond traded 
maturities that is higher than the last observed rate, suggesting a slightly upward sloping yield 
curve.  
 
The research in this chapter has implications for pension funds all over the world as they are 
increasingly more affected by changing demographics. The ratio of workers per retiree is 
decreasing at an alarming rate, making pension funds fear that they will soon not be able to 
honor their obligations anymore. This problem can be addressed not only through social 
policies, but also in terms of how the pension system as a whole is set up. In order to assess the 
magnitude of the problem, one must be able quantify how underfunded the pension funds are. 
Consequently, one must be certain they are discounting the obligations with the correct discount 
rate, otherwise the value we calculate to be put aside in order to meet later obligations might not 
be the true value of the obligations. Chapter 3 discusses the need to devise a way to discount 
very distant cash flows and points towards potential financial instruments that could provide a 
solution, like the UK infinite maturity bonds.  
 
The last incomplete-market setting that I study is related to the market for political 
contributions. The activity of companies is affected by the political decisions made in the country 
they operate in. However, one cannot trade in political decisions hence the market for political 
risk can be considered incomplete. It is natural though for companies to want to hedge against 
the risk of political decisions. In Chapter 4, I gather extensive information on all S&P500 
companies in a time span of 18 years (i.e., between 1993 and 2010). In particular, I focus on the 
political contributions they make to US Congressional election campaigns and the government 
procurements they receive following these contributions. What I observe in the data is that the 
vast majority of S&P500 companies contribute to election campaigns of candidates from both 
the Democratic and the Republican Party, which could be assimilated to a partial hedge against 
this type of risk.  
 
The results of this last study show that, in order to maximize the procurement value in the next 
period, companies should contribute to a large number of candidates taking part in 
Congressional races and preferably to candidates of the Republican Party. The effect of 
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contributions on the subsequent procurement value is positive and statistically significant not 
only in the whole sample analysis, but also in sub-sample analysis. There appears to be a 
reciprocal relationship between contributing S&P500 companies and the government in all 
election cycles, where an election cycle is defined as the two-year period between US 
Congressional elections in which an elected candidate exerts his term and contributions can be 
made for the next election.  
 
Election campaigns are something that everyone is familiar with and can relate to. The way 
these campaigns are funded and whether or not there is a connection between their outcome 
and public sector expenditures in the form of procurements is of importance to all tax payers. 
Chapter 4 opens the door for a discussion on a principal-agent type of problem (check this 
again). The agent in this case is the politician and the principal is the constituency. The politician 
is elected by the constituency and hence is expected to act in the best interests of this 
constituency. However, the politician’s decisions can be influenced by a third party - the highest 
paying interest group. The politician’s interest is to remain in power for as long as possible, thus 
he seeks reelection and collects political contributions in order to fund his election campaigns. If 
the politician promises political favors after reelection in return for generous contributions from 
high paying interest groups, this could be done at the expense of the interests of the 
constituency. In the end, it all boils down to how well government money is spent and whether 
or not it is actually spent in the interest of the tax payers.  
 
Overall, this dissertation brings together three different studies within the framework of 
incomplete markets and touches upon pricing and hedging issues in this particular framework. 
Its goal is not to give an exhaustive treatment of incomplete markets, but to show the 
importance of this concept and the various situations in which it can appear and how it can alter 
established results based on complete market arguments.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Closed-form solutions for options in incomplete markets1 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to show how call options written on infrequently traded or non-
traded assets can be priced in the setting of incomplete markets. Specifically, we assume that the 
underlying asset of the option carries both hedgeable and unhedgeable risk and apply the 
principles of model ambiguity to value the option and bring new insights into the predictions of 
standard option pricing models. The result is a modified Black-Scholes (1973) closed-form 
solution. We derive an upper and a lower bound for the price of the option and find that, 
contrary to standard option pricing theory, the incomplete market option prices do not always 
display an increasing pattern when the volatility of the underlying asset increases. In fact, we 
show that the lower bound prices can decrease in response to an increase in the volatility of the 
underlying asset, when the underlying is either infrequently traded or non-traded.  
 
The main contribution of our paper is to highlight the existence of the inverse relationship 
between the option value and the volatility of the underlying asset and the potential for early 
exercise even for an American call option on a non-dividend paying asset. These features appear 
in an incomplete market as direct consequences of unhedgeable risk coming from an 
infrequently traded or even non-traded underlying asset. However, they are overlooked by 
complete market models, because such models take into account only hedgeable sources of risk.  
 
Standard option pricing models are complete market models, which assume that all sources of 
risk can be perfectly hedged against and that options can be priced based on replication 
arguments. The main prediction of such models is that option value increases with an increase in 
the volatility of the underlying asset. The problem is that, if the underlying asset of an option is 
an infrequently traded asset or even a non-traded one, the replication arguments fall apart, 
because we can no longer construct a riskless replicating portfolio out of a risk-free asset and 
                                                          
1 This is joint work with prof. dr. Antoon Pelsser. We are grateful for all the helpful comments we received from our 
colleagues at Maastricht University and the audiences at the 2013 ASTIN Colloquium of the International Actuarial 
Association in the Hague, the 2012 World Congress of the Bachelier Finance Society in Sydney, the School of Banking 
and Finance of University of New South Wales in Sydney, whose hospitality is highly appreciated, and the 2012 AsRES 
- AREUEA Joint International Conference in Singapore. The authors also thank NWO (the Dutch Organization for 
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the underlying asset and equate the price of the option with the cost of this replicating portfolio 
as in the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model.  
 
This problem has been considered before. There are three strands of literature which try to 
tackle the problem: utility indifference pricing, pricing via coherent risk measures and pricing 
via a Sharpe ratio criterion. 
 
Utility indifference pricing assumes a utility function for a representative agent who maximizes 
his utility of wealth, where wealth is influenced by an investment in the option. Duffie et al. 
(1997) derive optimal consumption and portfolio allocations in the context of incomplete 
markets. Davis (2006) focuses on the optimal hedging strategy in an incomplete market where 
an option is written on a non-traded asset and shows that the difference between complete and 
incomplete market prices is substantial.  
 
Henderson (2007) and Miao and Wang (2007) restrict their analyses to real estate projects and 
derive semi-closed form solutions for options written on real estate assets using the utility 
indifference pricing technique. Both Henderson (2007) and Miao and Wang (2007) show that 
market incompleteness, in particular the degree of risk aversion, can actually reduce the option 
value. 
 
The utility indifference pricing approach is a promising candidate for a pricing mechanism. It is a 
convenient method to derive a partial differential equation that the option price must satisfy. 
However, results have been obtained mainly for exponential utility and power utility. 
Furthermore, exponential utility cannot price short call positions, because the prices converge to 
infinity (Henderson and Hobson, 2004), and power utility cannot price any short positions 
(Henderson (2002) and Henderson and Hobson (2002)).  
 
Pricing via a coherent risk measure was first introduced by Artzner et al. (1999) and it is defined 
as the supremum of the expected negative of final net worth for a set of probability measures. 
Carr et al. (2001) refine this idea. They argue that economic agents will not only invest in any 
arbitrage opportunity, but also in any opportunity that seems acceptable given their level of risk 
aversion. The problem is that the concept of ‘acceptable opportunity’ is a subjective one and it 
cannot be easily generalized to a market, but it rather characterizes a particular economic agent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Scientific Research) for the generous support in the form of a three-year grant via the Graduate Programme 2011 
(correspondence number 2011/08865/BOO). 
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Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and later Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) put forward the 
idea of pricing via a Sharpe ratio criterion, by exploiting the fact that investors would always 
trade in assets with very high Sharpe ratios and pure arbitrage opportunities. Whenever we 
want to price a general claim, we calculate the expectation of a stochastic discount factor times 
the payoff of that claim (Cochrane, 2005). This is straightforward in a complete market, where 
all assets are assumed to be traded which means that we can observe their market price of risk. 
The volatility term of the stochastic discount factor is nothing else than the Sharpe ratio of the 
asset we are trying to price (Cochrane, 2005). Unfortunately, in an incomplete market, we 
cannot observe the market price of risk, because here there are also infrequently traded or even 
non-traded assets. We can however distinguish between hedgeable and unhedgeable risk and 
express the market price of risk for the unhedgeable component in terms of what we already 
know: the Sharpe ratio of a traded asset. This Sharpe ratio is an essential tool in determining the 
expression for the overall volatility of the stochastic discount factor, such that we can restrict the 
set of all possible discount factors to obtain the option price. 
 
The methodology we propose takes the model ambiguity framework of Hansen and Sargent 
(2001) and Andersen et al. (2003) and applies it to the pricing of contingent claims. Model 
ambiguity starts from the idea that the model used might be misspecified and allows for 
parameter uncertainty by specifying a confidence interval around the drift and diffusion terms 
of a stochastic process. We assume that the diffusion is known with certainty, but that there is 
uncertainty regarding the drift term. Furthermore, we restrict the total volatility of the 
stochastic discount factor to be lower than or equal to an exogenous k and show that imposing 
this restriction is equivalent to setting a confidence interval around the drift term of a stochastic 
process. The result is a finite set of stochastic discount factors, leading to an interval for the 
option price. We study the upper and lower bound prices and document the different properties 
comparing to the complete market prices of the Black-Scholes (1973) model.  
 
The parameters which ultimately determine the incomplete market value of the option are the 
volatility of the underlying asset, the restriction on the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, 
the correlation coefficient between the underlying and a traded risky asset and the expected 
return of the investment. Interestingly, unlike in the standard option pricing models, the 
incomplete market option prices do not always increase as the volatility of the underlying asset 
increases. In fact, the lower bound prices are decreasing with increasing volatility of the 
underlying. This is a reflection of the additional uncertainty coming from the presence of 
unhedgeable risk, a feature of an incomplete market but not of the Black-Scholes (1973) 
complete-market setting.  
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The negative relationship between option value and the volatility of the underlying gives rise to 
another phenomenon: the early exercise of an American call option even for a non-dividend 
paying asset. At the lower bound, the option value is decreasing with increasing volatility of the 
underlying asset, forcing the economic agent to exercise his option early for fear that, if he 
continues to wait, he will lose the entire value of the claim.  
 
The advantage of our pricing mechanism over other incomplete market techniques is that the 
resulting option prices do not depend on a risk aversion parameter. However, even though one 
need not make any assumptions about the utility function of a representative economic agent 
and implicitly about this agent’s level of risk aversion, one is still required to impose a restriction 
on the total volatility of the stochastic discount factor. This restriction is an exogenous 
parameter in our framework. 
 
Our closed-form solutions are comparable to the Black-Scholes (1973) option price. For very low 
values of the volatility of the underlying, the only source of uncertainty comes from the traded 
asset and we are back in the Black-Scholes (1973) framework. Similarly, for very high values of 
the correlation coefficient ρ, the upper and lower bound prices approach the Black-Scholes 
(1973) price by √1 − 𝜌2, meaning that there is a large gap between the prices on an almost 
complete market and the Black-Scholes price at ρ = 1. Even at a ρ = 0.99, √1 − 𝜌2 is already 
equal to 0.14. This is also documented by Davis (2006) via a utility indifference approach. 
Furthermore, when the restriction on the volatility of the stochastic discount factor is exactly 
equal to the Sharpe ratio of the traded asset, we again exit the incomplete market setting and the 
incomplete market prices converge to the Black-Scholes (1973) price. In other words, we 
generalize the market setting to the incomplete market and bring it closer to real life, yet, at the 
same time, maintain a reference point, which is the Black-Scholes (1973) result.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 develops an incomplete market 
pricing mechanism by applying model ambiguity concepts to the pricing of general claims, 
Section 2.3 derives closed-form solutions for a European call option in incomplete markets and 
analyzes the behavior of these prices for different parameter values, Section 2.4 presents closed-
form solutions for a perpetual American call option in incomplete markets, and Section 2.5 
concludes. 
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2.2. Incomplete markets - a closer look 
 
The classical complete market model, the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model, relies on 
the following assumptions: the price process for the underlying asset follows a geometric 
Brownian motion, the underlying asset is continuously traded and it pays no dividends, short 
selling is allowed, there are no transaction costs or taxes and there are no riskless arbitrage 
opportunities (Hull, 2012). In reality though, economic agents are confronted with a series of 
imperfections. For instance, whenever non-traded or infrequently traded assets are present in a 
market, that market becomes incomplete, because there are more sources of randomness than 
traded assets to span them (Björk, 2009).  
 
The continuous trading assumption is the one that makes our case. The underlying idea of the 
Black-Scholes (1973) model is that we can construct a riskless replicating portfolio, by selling 
the option and buying delta units of the underlying asset. To satisfy the no-arbitrage condition, 
we then equate the instantaneous return of this portfolio with the return of a riskless asset. 
However, this is only possible because we can continuously trade in the underlying asset of the 
option. But, in a market that is incomplete due to the presence of infrequently traded or even 
non-traded assets, if the underlying happens to be one of these problematic assets, then we can 
no longer perform the option valuation based on replication arguments.  
 
As Duffie (1987) shows, the problem with pricing in incomplete markets is that imposing the no-
arbitrage condition is no longer sufficient to arrive at a unique price for a general contingent 
claim (i.e., for a financial derivative). Take for example a non-traded underlying asset. It is 
impossible to exactly replicate a claim on such an asset, so we can expect to be confronted with 
more than one price system consistent with absence of arbitrage for this claim. In fact, if we just 
impose the no-arbitrage condition, the price will be situated within the arbitrage bounds (i.e., 
the interval given by all the possible values for the option price that satisfy the no-arbitrage 
condition). For a call option, the lower arbitrage bound is zero and the upper arbitrage bound is 
the price of the underlying. Such an interval is not very informative, because it is too wide to be 
useful. The solution is to make additional assumptions about the choice of the pricing kernel 
(Duffie et al., 1997).  
 
The solution we propose applies the idea of model ambiguity of Hansen and Sargent (2001) and 
Anderson et al. (2003) to the pricing of contingent claims. Model ambiguity acknowledges the 
fact that the model used might be misspecified and assumes a confidence interval around the 
drift and diffusion terms of a stochastic process. We make the assumption that there is 
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uncertainty only around the drift term of a stochastic process and that this process is the 
underlying of a contingent claim. We show that this uncertainty in the drift term is equivalent to 
restricting the volatility of the stochastic discount factor to be at most k, where k is exogenously 
determined, and that we can establish an upper and a lower bound price for the contingent 
claim.  
 
2.2.1. Pricing contingent claims with model ambiguity  
 
We analyze pricing in incomplete markets for the special case of a monotonically increasing 
payoff - the call option – and we derive upper and lower bound prices for this special case. We 
assume partly hedgeable and partly unhedgeable risk and that we can find on the market a 
traded risky asset, correlated with the illiquid underlying asset, with which we can hedge the 
underlying at least partly.  
 
We have a call option written on an infrequently traded asset V. There exists a traded riskless 
asset B, a traded risky asset S, for instance a stock, which is correlated with V and which we can 
use as a partial hedge for V. The dynamics of the assets are:  
  
𝑑𝑆𝑡 =  𝜇𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑊1                                                              (2.1) 
𝑑𝑉𝑡 =  𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑉𝑉𝑡(𝜌𝑑𝑊1 + √1 − 𝜌2𝑑𝑊2)                                           (2.2) 
𝑑𝐵𝑡 = 𝑟𝐵𝑡𝑑𝑡                                                                          (2.3) 
 
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between assets V and S, (W1,W2) is a two-dimensional 
standard Brownian motion and r is a deterministic short interest rate.  
 
Like any other contingent claim, our call option can be priced as the expectation of a stochastic 
discount factor times the payoff of the option (Björk, 2009): 
 
𝐶𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡
𝑃 [
𝛬𝑇
𝛬𝑡
(𝑉𝑇 −  𝐾)
+]                                                                    (2.4) 
where      𝐶 – the price of the call option 
    Λ – a stochastic discount factor 
                 𝐸𝑃 – the expectation under the probability measure P 
                 𝑉𝑇– the value of the infrequently traded asset at maturity time T 
                 𝐾 – the constant strike price of the option 
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In order to price the option, we need a change of probability measure from the physical (or real-
world) measure P, to an equivalent measure, which we generically call QA. We search for any 
probability measure QA equivalent to the physical measure P. The stochastic discount factor Λ is 
then the product of a risk-free discount factor and the Radon-Nikodym derivative dQA/dP (Björk, 
2009). The price of the option under the probability measure QA is given by:  
 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)𝐸𝑡
𝑄𝐴[(𝑉𝑇 −  𝐾)
+]                                                         (2.5) 
 
The process for the stochastic discount factor must price both hedgeable and unhedgeable 
sources of risks: 
 
𝑑𝛬𝑡 =  −𝑟𝛬𝑡𝑑𝑡 − 𝜅1𝛬𝑡𝑑𝑊1 − 𝜅2𝛬𝑡𝑑𝑊2                                                 (2.6) 
where:      κ1 – market price of hedgeable risk 
                   κ2 – market price of unhedgeable risk 
 
In a complete market, the volatility of the stochastic discount factor can be interpreted as the 
market price of risk or the Sharpe ratio of a traded risky asset. Furthermore, the martingale 
measure can be uniquely identified as the risk-neutral measure, leading to a unique price. In fact, 
it was Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) who first put forward the idea that in a complete market 
restricting the volatility of the stochastic discount factor is equivalent to restricting the Sharpe 
ratio of a traded risky asset. In an incomplete market, we can no longer uniquely identify the 
martingale measure. We can however restrict the set of possible stochastic discount factors.  
 
First, following Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), we fix the market price of hedgeable risk κ1 to 
be equal to the Sharpe ratio 
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
 of asset S, which is an observable quantity. The stochastic 
discount factor in this context becomes: 
 
𝑑𝛬𝑡 =  −𝑟𝛬𝑡𝑑𝑡 −
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
𝛬𝑡𝑑𝑊1 − 𝜅2𝛬𝑡𝑑𝑊2                                                 (2.7) 
 
Next, we restrict the total volatility of the stochastic discount factor to be at most k: 
 
  |𝜅| = √𝜅1
2 + 𝜅2
2 ≤  𝑘                                                                   (2.8) 
 
After substituting 𝜅1 =
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
 and solving for κ2, we find: 
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𝜅2 ∈ [−√𝑘2 − (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
 )
2
, √𝑘2 − (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
 )
2
 ]                                                (2.9) 
 
Even though κ2 cannot be observed, because it is the market price of unhedgeable risk, it can be 
expressed in terms of the exogenous restriction k and the observable market price of hedgeable 
risk. The interval for κ2 leads to an interval for the option price with an upper and a lower bound.  
 
The change of probability measure from measure P to measure QA implies a two-dimensional 
Girsanov transformation on process V: 
 
𝑑𝑊1 = 𝑑𝑊1̂ −
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
𝑑𝑡                                                             (2.10) 
𝑑𝑊2 = 𝑑𝑊2̂ − 𝜅2𝑑𝑡                                                                (2.11) 
 
leading to a new stochastic process for V with a modified drift term: 
 
𝑑𝑉𝑡 =  (𝜇𝑉 − 𝜎𝑉𝜌
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
− 𝜎𝑉√1 − 𝜌2𝜅2)𝑉𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑉𝑉𝑡(𝜌𝑑𝑊1̂ + √1 − 𝜌2𝑑𝑊2̂)                   (2.12) 
 
Notice that the Girsanov transformation affects only the drift term of process V and the 
adjustment it makes is equal to the volatility of the stochastic discount factor. The expected 
return 𝜇𝑉  is now lower by the market price of each type of risk, but proportionately to how 
much can be hedged and how much is left unhedged (ρ and √1 − 𝜌2, respectively). 
 
It can be shown that at the upper bound  𝜅2 = −√𝑘2 −  (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
)
2
 and at the lower bound 
𝜅2 = √𝑘2 −  (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
)
2
. Using the Feynman-Kac formula, it follows that the option price C must 
satisfy a PDE of the form: 
 
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑡
+ (𝜇𝑉 − 𝜎𝑉𝜌
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
− 𝜎𝑉√1 − 𝜌2𝜅2)𝑉𝑡
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑉
+
1
2
𝜎𝑉
2𝑉𝑡
2 𝜕
2𝐶
𝜕𝑉2
− 𝑟𝐶 = 0                              (2.13) 
 
The call price is monotonically increasing in the price of the underlying (i.e., 
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑉
> 0), which 
means that the value of 𝜅2 which maximizes the call value and leads to the upper bound price is 
−√𝑘2 −  (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
)
2
 and the value of 𝜅2 which minimizes the call value to yield the lower bound 
price is √𝑘2 −  (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
)
2
.  
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The difficult step of pricing with model ambiguity is specifying the volatility restriction k. Once 
we have found a traded risky asset correlated with the non-traded (or infrequently traded) 
underlying asset of the option, we can express the restriction k on the volatility of the stochastic 
discount factor in terms of the Sharpe ratio of this traded asset. Mathematically, k must be at 
least equal to the Sharpe ratio of the risky traded asset S in order for 
𝜅2 = [−√𝑘2 − (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
)
2
, √𝑘2 − (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
)
2
 ] to be defined. The larger the difference between the 
restriction k and the Sharpe ratio of the traded risky asset is the wider the option price bounds 
become. Furthermore, these particular choices of κ2 are designed for monotone payoffs only. 
 
2.2.2. Good deal bounds, coherent measures of risk and model ambiguity 
 
Mathematically, the concepts of good deal bounds pricing, coherent measures of risk and model 
ambiguity are equivalent.  
 
Restriction (2.8) is inspired by the model ambiguity framework of Hansen and Sargent (2001) 
and Anderson et al. (2003). Model ambiguity acknowledges the fact that the model used might 
be misspecified and assumes a confidence interval around the drift and diffusion terms of a 
stochastic process. Imagine that we specify a confidence interval around the drift term 𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 in 
equation (2.2) and that we know the diffusion term with certainty. Furthermore, assume that the 
width of the confidence interval is 2k times the standard deviation 𝜎𝑉𝑉𝑡. The confidence interval 
around the drift term is then [𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 − 𝑘𝜎𝑉𝑉𝑡, 𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 + 𝑘𝜎𝑉𝑉𝑡], which is exactly the representation in 
equation (2.12), i.e., [𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 − (𝜅1𝜌𝜎𝑉 + 𝜅2√1 − 𝜌
2𝜎
𝑉
) 𝑉𝑡 , 𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 + (−𝜅1𝜌𝜎𝑉 − 𝜅2√1 − 𝜌
2𝜎
𝑉
) 𝑉𝑡] 
and √𝜅1
2 + 𝜅2
2 ≤  𝑘.  
 
Good-deal bounds pricing is another incomplete market pricing mechanism, which uses a 
restriction on the total volatility of the stochastic discount factor as an additional restriction to 
arrive at tighter and more informative bounds for the option price. Hansen and Jagannathan 
(1991) and later Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) exploit the fact that investors would always 
trade in assets with very high Sharpe ratios and pure arbitrage opportunities. Consequently, 
such investments would immediately disappear from the market, so we should only be 
interested in a Sharpe ratio that is high enough to induce trade, but not too high to include the 
deals which are too good to be true. The good-deal bounds pricing mechanism is simply a tool to 
rule out these too good deals and the arbitrage opportunities (which Björk and Slinko (2006) 
call “ridiculously good deals”), such that the result is an option price within a tight and 
informative interval. Hodges (1998), Černý (2003) and Björk and Slinko (2006) even extend the 
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Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) setting to generalized Sharpe ratios for pricing in incomplete 
markets.  If the total volatility of the stochastic discount factor k is simply set equal to the Sharpe 
ratio of a traded risky asset, then the approach in Section 2.2.1 reduces to good-deal bounds 
pricing.  
 
The representation in equation (2.8) is also a coherent measure of risk. What we search for are 
all measures QA lower than or equal to k, such that we can place an upper bound k on the total 
volatility of the stochastic discount factor. This translates into a minimization over the set of all 
the risk measures QA and equation (2.5) can be re-written as: 
 
𝐶𝑡 = min𝑄𝐴≤𝑘 𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)𝐸𝑡
𝑄𝐴[(𝑉𝑇 −  𝐾)
+]                                               (2.14) 
 
In this case, the minimum of the payoff leads to the lower bound and the maximum (i.e., the 
minimum of the negative payoff) leads to the upper bound of the price of the call option. Under 
the notation in equation (2.14), our ambiguity approach to contingent claim pricing is a coherent 
risk measure as defined by Artzner et al. (1999). Any risk measure that is coherent satisfies the 
following four properties: translational invariance, subadditivity, positive homogeneity and 
monotonicity, and it is defined as the supremum of the expected negative of final net worth for a 
set of probability measures. Delbaen (2002) further shows that any coherent risk measure can 
be expressed as a worst expected loss over a given set of probabilities and Jaschke and Küchler 
(2001) link the good-deal bounds to coherent risk measures as well by showing that the good-
deal bounds are coherent valuation bounds. 
 
2.2.3. On the selection of k 
 
Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) suggest that the bound k be set equal to twice the market 
price of risk on the stock market. In other words, we relate the unknown k to something that we 
can find out, the Sharpe ratio of a traded asset. Similarly, we could set k equal to the highest 
Sharpe ratio ever documented on the equity market. It is even possible to imply the value of k 
from market data, with a procedure similar to the one used to imply volatilities from option 
prices.  
 
The best way to determine k is probably the model ambiguity framework of Hansen and Sargent 
(2001): specify a confidence interval around the drift term of V and assume that the diffusion 
term is known with certainty. An estimate for k can be easily obtained using historical data on V. 
For a 95% confidence interval, 
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[𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 − (𝜅1𝜌𝜎𝑉 + 𝜅2√1 − 𝜌2𝜎𝑉)𝑉𝑡 , 𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 + (−𝜅1𝜌𝜎𝑉 − 𝜅2√1 − 𝜌2𝜎𝑉)𝑉𝑡] = [𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 − 1.96 ∗ 𝑆𝐸, 𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 +
1.96 ∗ 𝑆𝐸] = [𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 − 1.96 ∗
𝜎𝑉𝑉𝑡
√𝑛
, 𝜇𝑉𝑉𝑡 + 1.96 ∗
𝜎𝑉𝑉𝑡
√𝑛
], meaning that 𝜅2 reduces to 𝜅2 =
1.96−𝜅1𝜌√𝑛
√𝑛(1−𝜌2)
  
and 𝑘 = √
(1.96−𝜅1𝜌√𝑛)
2
+𝜅1
2𝑛(1−𝜌2)
𝑛(1−𝜌2)
 , where 𝜅1 =
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
 and n is the number of years of historical 
data. The higher n is, the lower the uncertainty around the drift term is and the tighter the price 
bounds are. For instance, if we assume that 𝜌 = 0.8 and 𝜅1 = 0.25, then an increase in the 
number of years of historical data from 𝑛 = 25 to 𝑛 = 50 determines a decrease in k from 0.4 to 
0.28 and implicitly a considerable tightening of the price bounds.  
 
2.2.4. Interpretation of the upper and lower price bounds 
 
Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) point towards a nice interpretation of the price bounds as a 
bid-ask spread. The lower bound would correspond to the bid price and the upper bound, to the 
ask price. The bid and ask prices also relate to reservation prices. The buyer’s reservation price 
shows the buyer’s maximum valuation of an asset and the seller’s reservation price his minimum 
valuation of that asset. For any price lower than his maximum valuation, the buyer will agree to 
buy and, for any price higher than his minimum valuation, the seller will want to sell. Otherwise, 
no transaction occurs.  
 
The bid-ask spread idea is reiterated by Carr et al. (2001), who argue that economic agents will 
not only invest in any arbitrage opportunity, but also invest in any acceptable opportunity. 
Acceptable opportunities are defined as claims for which the difference between their payoff and 
their hedge is not necessarily non-negative, but simply acceptable according to the level of risk 
aversion of the economic agent. An arbitrage opportunity is a special case of an acceptable 
opportunity.  
 
Inspired by, among others, Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) and Carr et al. (2001), Cherny and 
Madan (2010) introduce the concepts of ‘conic finance’ and ‘two price markets’. Essentially, they 
argue that every asset should be characterized by a bid and an ask price, not by one price, and 
derive closed-form solutions for both put and call options. The presence of the bid-ask spreads is 
motivated by the different levels of liquidity in the market.  
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2.2. The European call option in incomplete markets 
 
In this section, we derive closed-form solutions for the upper and lower bound of a European 
call option written on an infrequently traded asset and we look at the implications of incomplete 
markets on these prices. We compare our results to the Black-Scholes (1973) complete-market 
case and show that, contrary to standard option pricing theory, an increase in the volatility of 
the underlying asset does not always lead to an increase in the option value.  
 
2.3.1. Upper and lower bound closed-form solutions  
 
The market setting is still an incomplete market, with a traded risky asset S, a traded riskless 
asset B and an infrequently traded asset V correlated with S. The dynamics of the assets are the 
ones in equations (2.1)-(2.3). We assume the existence of a European type of call option written 
on asset V.  
 
We start by reminding the reader of the dynamics of asset V in equation (12) of Section 2.2. An 
equivalent way of writing equation (2.12) is: 
 
𝑑𝑉𝑡 = (𝑟 − 𝑞1)𝑉𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑉𝑉𝑡(𝜌𝑑𝑊1̂ + √1 − 𝜌2𝑑𝑊1̂)                                   (2.15) 
where:     𝑞1 = 𝑟 − 𝜇𝑉 + 𝜎𝑉𝜌
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
+ 𝜎𝑉√1 − 𝜌2𝜅2 
 
If μV, σV and κ2 are constants, then V follows a lognormal distribution. The process for V now 
resembles the process for a stock paying a dividend yield equal to q1, so we can express the time 
zero option price as the Black-Scholes (1973) price of a call option on a dividend paying stock: 
 
𝐶0 =  𝑉0𝑒
−𝑞1𝑇𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2)                                                  (2.16) 
𝐶0 =  𝑒
−𝑟𝑇 [𝑉0𝑒
[𝜇𝑉 − 𝜎𝑉𝜌(
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
) − 𝜎𝑉√1−𝜌2𝜅2]𝑇
𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑁(𝑑2)]                          (2.17) 
where:      𝑁(. ) − 𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   
                   𝑑1 =  
𝑙𝑛(
𝑉0
𝐾
)+[𝜇𝑉 – 𝜎𝑉𝜌(
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
) – 𝜎𝑉√1−𝜌2𝜅2 + 
𝜎𝑉
2
2
]𝑇
𝜎𝑉√𝑇
 
                   𝑑2 =  𝑑1 − 𝜎𝑉√𝑇 
                   𝑉0 − 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
                   𝜅2 = −√𝑘2 −  (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
)
2
 ,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 
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                   𝜅2 = √𝑘2 − (
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
)
2
 ,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 
 
The final option price is a modified version of the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing formula. 
The modification reflects exactly the adjusted drift term that was used to describe the process V 
under the new probability measure QA and which appears in equation (2.12). The drift is 
adjusted downwards to reflect the higher degree of uncertainty which exists in an incomplete 
market compared to a complete market due to the proportion of the total risk which remains 
unhedged.  
 
Notice that, unlike in the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model, in the incomplete market, 
the expected return μV is still present in the expression for the option price (see equation (2.17)). 
Even if we were able to find a traded asset S that is perfectly correlated with our underlying, 
making ρ equal to 1, the pricing formula would still depend on the expected return of the illiquid 
asset V. This is because the underlying and the risky asset correlated with it have different 
expected returns and both have to be taken into account in the pricing mechanism. 
 
As a final remark, the reader should bear in mind that we are not modeling a market for 
homogeneous goods for which there are numerous buyers and sellers bidding and asking prices 
at the same time (like a stock market), but a market for infrequently traded assets, where 
occasionally there exists an interested buyer or a seller. Under these conditions, we can only 
specify the likely interval for the price of the option. Eventually, by making additional 
assumptions about the type of market and about which counterparty we are (the buyer or the 
seller), we could uniquely determine the price of the option. 
 
2.3.2. Implications for the European call option 
 
We continue with a sensitivity analysis for the price of a European call option in incomplete 
markets. Standard (complete-market) option pricing theory predicts that an increase in the 
volatility of the underlying asset always leads to an increase in the value of the option. The 
pricing mechanism presented in Section 2.2, which assumes an incomplete market, implies that 
this is not always the case. This can best be seen graphically in Figure 2.1, where, all else equal, 
the volatility of the underlying asset increases from 1% to as much as 50%, but the option prices 
on the lower bound no longer follow an increasing pattern.  
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Figure 2.1: The sensitivity of the call price with respect to the volatility of the underlying asset (upper and 
lower bound prices vs. Black-Scholes prices). The parameter values are as follows: σS = 16%, μS = 8%, r = 4%, 
Sharpe ratio asset S = 0.25, k = 0.5, ρ = 0.8, V0 = 100, K = 60, T = 1 year and 𝜇𝑉 = 𝑟 + 𝜌
𝜎𝑉
𝜎𝑆
(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟). 
 
 
By fixing the market price of risk and all other parameters except for the volatility of the 
underlying asset, we see that at an increase in the volatility of the underlying both the Black-
Scholes (1973) option price and the upper bound prices are increasing. However, the lower 
bound prices display a decreasing pattern, instead of an increasing one as we would expect. This 
means that we are willing to pay less and less for an asset as uncertainty increases (the lower 
bound prices are the buyer’s reservation prices). This is exactly the feature that cannot be 
explained by the complete-market models which take into account only the hedgeable sources of 
risk, not the unhedgeable ones as well. However, the results are consistent with the findings of 
Henderson (2007) and Miao and Wang (2007), who also conclude via utility indifference pricing 
that market incompleteness can decrease the option value. 
 
For very low values of σV, the prices converge, because, if we eliminate all the uncertainty in the 
underlying asset (i.e., the infrequently traded asset), the only source of uncertainty left comes 
from the traded asset and we are back in the Black-Scholes (1973) framework. As σV increases 
though, the effect of the unhedged risk also increases and that is reflected in the steady widening 
of the bounds. Note that, for arbitrage reasons, the following CAPM-type of relationship must 
hold: 𝜇𝑉 = 𝑟 + 𝜌
𝜎𝑉
𝜎𝑆
(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟) (see Davis, 2006). 
 
The inverse relationship between the option value and the volatility of the underlying is not 
independent of the moneyness of the option though. In fact, as Figure 2.2 shows, the more in-the-
money the call option is the more pronounced this inverse relationship is. As soon as the option 
is at-the-money, the negative effect of volatility on option value disappears.  
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Figure 2.2: The lower bound prices for different values of the strike price and of the volatility of the 
underlying asset. The parameter values are as follows: V0 = 100, T = 1 year, r = 4%, σV = 15%, σS = 16%, μS = 
8%, ρ = 0.8, Sharpe ratio S = 0.25. The drift term is still given by: 𝜇𝑉 = 𝑟 + 𝜌
𝜎𝑉
𝜎𝑆
(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟). 
 
 
A very important parameter for the option price is the restriction k on the total volatility of the 
stochastic discount factor. We know that the stochastic discount factor is the product of a risk-
free discount factor and a Radon-Nikodym derivative (Björk, 2009). Its expected value is a 
constant and it is equal to the risk-free discount factor. It is the variance of the stochastic 
discount factor that changes and that we restrict via k. The variance of the stochastic discount 
factor shows the “distance” between the physical (real world) probability measure P and the 
new probability measure QA. When these two probability measures are very close to each other, 
the variance of the stochastic discount factor is low and the price bounds are tight. The farther 
the probability measures are from each other, the higher the variance of the stochastic discount 
factor is and the wider the bounds become. 
 
The effect of the volatility restriction k on the option price is presented in Figure 2.3. When the 
restriction is exactly equal to the Sharpe ratio of the traded asset, we exit the incomplete market 
setting and the upper and lower bound prices converge to the Black-Scholes price. Afterwards, 
as k increases the bounds widen. The prices on the lower bound decrease rapidly and the ones 
on the upper bound experience a sharp increase.  
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Figure 2.3: The sensitivity of the call price with respect to the restriction on the volatility of the stochastic 
discount factor. The parameter values are as follows: V0 = 100, K = 70, T = 1 year, r = 4%, σV = 15%, σS = 16%, 
μS = 8%, ρ = 0.8, Sharpe ratio S = 0.25 and 𝜇𝑉 = 𝑟 + 𝜌
𝜎𝑉
𝜎𝑆
(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟). 
 
 
The correlation coefficient ρ between the underlying asset and the traded risky asset also plays a 
role in determining the behavior of the option prices. Figure 2.4 shows that as the correlation 
coefficient increases and the partial hedge improves, the upper and lower bound prices 
approach the Black-Scholes price more and more. In fact, for a perfect (negative or positive) 
correlation, the upper and the lower bound prices become equal. The largest price difference can 
be observed at the other extreme, when ρ = 0, because here we cannot hedge any part of the risk 
and we deal only with unhedgeable sources of risk.  
 
Figure 2.4: The sensitivity of the call price with respect to the correlation coefficient between the underlying 
asset and the correlated traded risky asset. The parameter values are as follows: V0 = 100, K = 70, T = 1 year, r 
= 4%, σV = 15%, σS = 16%, μS = 8%, Sharpe ratio S = 0.25 and 𝜇𝑉 = 𝑟 + 𝜌
𝜎𝑉
𝜎𝑆
(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟). 
 
 
The interesting fact about Figure 2.4 is that there is a large gap between the prices on an almost 
complete market and the Black-Scholes price at ρ = 1. In fact, the incomplete market prices 
approach the Black-Scholes price by √1 − 𝜌2. This is consistent with the results of Davis (2006), 
via a utility indifference approach.  
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Following Davis (2006), we make the notation: 
 
𝜀 = √1 − 𝜌2                                                                       (2.18) 
 
in order to perform a Taylor expansion around ε=0 (i.e., for ρ=1). Knowing that 𝜇𝑉 = 𝑟 +
𝜌
𝜎𝑉
𝜎𝑆
(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟) = 𝑟 +
𝜎𝑉
𝜎𝑆
(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟)√1 − 𝜀2, the incomplete market price in equation (2.17) becomes: 
 
𝐶0 = 𝑉0𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) − 𝜀𝑁(𝑑1)𝑉0𝜎𝑉𝜅2𝑇 + 𝑂(𝜀
2) 
               = 𝐵𝑆 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝜀𝑁(𝑑1)𝑉0𝜎𝑉𝜅2𝑇 + 𝑂(𝜀
2)                                                       (2.19) 
where:    O(.) – higher order terms 
 
The incomplete market option price converges to the BS price of a call option on a non-dividend 
paying asset with ε, where ε is defined in equation (2.18). Even at a ρ = 0.99, ε is already equal to 
0.14 and it has a substantial impact on the BS price. Furthermore, since the incomplete market 
prices are a modified version of the Black-Scholes (1973) price, the second term of the Taylor 
expansion in equation (2.19) incorporates a ‘delta-effect’: 𝑁(𝑑1), the delta measure of a call 
option written on a non-dividend paying asset, multiplied by additional terms to account for 
market incompleteness. 
 
 
2.3. The American call option in incomplete markets 
 
In this section, we discuss American-style call options and show that closed-form solutions are 
available in this case. We emphasize the early exercise feature that the negative relationship 
between option value and volatility of the underlying adds to an American call option. 
 
The advantage of deriving prices for American type of options is that we are also able to time an 
investment, not only calculate its value. In a complete market, the price of an American call 
option coincides with the price of a European call option, because there is no incentive to 
exercise the option early as long as the underlying asset does not pay any dividends. However, 
we show that in an incomplete market, where the underlying asset of an option is either 
infrequently traded or non-traded, the economic agent does have an incentive to exercise an 
American call option early when he is faced with increasing unhedgeable risk which erodes the 
option value. Furthermore, Merton (1973) showed that, in a complete market setting, the prices 
of perpetual American options are closed-form solutions. Hence, we conduct our analysis for a 
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perpetual American option, such that we can arrive at analytical formulas comparable to the 
ones obtained in Section 2.3.  
 
Assume that F(V) is the price of a perpetual American call option written on V, where V is the 
infrequently traded asset described by the stochastic process in equation (2.2). For ease of 
calculations, we make a notation for the drift term of the stochastic process in equation (2.2): 
?̃? = 𝜇𝑉 − 𝜎𝑉𝜌
𝜇𝑆−𝑟
𝜎𝑆
− 𝜎𝑉√1 − 𝜌2𝜅2. According to the Feynman-Kac formula, claim F must satisfy 
the following PDE: 
 
𝐹𝑡 + 𝐹𝑉?̃?𝑉 +
1
2
𝐹𝑉𝑉𝜎𝑉
2𝑉2 − 𝑟𝐹 = 0                                                   (2.20) 
where:    r – deterministic short interest rate 
 
Merton (1973) showed that the PDE in equation (2.20) reduces to an ODE, due to the fact that 
the perpetual option has infinite maturity (i.e., 𝑡 → ∞). The derivative of F with respect to time 
drops out and equation (2.20) reduces to: 
 
𝐹𝑉?̃?𝑉 +
1
2
𝐹𝑉𝑉𝜎𝑉
2𝑉2 − 𝑟𝐹 = 0                                                       (2.21) 
s.t.   𝐹(0) = 0  (boundary condition) 
        𝐹(𝑉∗) = 𝑉∗ − 𝐾  (value-matching condition)  
        𝐹′(𝑉∗) = 1  (smooth-pasting condition) 
 
Assume that F(V) is of the form 𝐹(𝑉) =  𝑉𝜆. Then: 
 
𝜆2
1
2
𝜎𝑉
2 + 𝜆 (?̃? −
1
2
𝜎𝑉
2) − 𝑟 = 0                                                 (2.22) 
 
For 𝑉𝜆 > 0, the solutions to equation (2.22) are: 
 
 𝜆1 = −
√𝜎𝑉
4+(8𝑟−4?̃?)𝜎𝑉
2+4?̃?2−𝜎𝑉
2+2?̃?
2𝜎𝑉
2   and 𝜆2 =
√𝜎𝑉
4+(8𝑟−4?̃?)𝜎𝑉
2+4?̃?2+𝜎𝑉
2−2?̃?
2𝜎𝑉
2                    (2.23) 
 
For arbitrary constants C1 and C2, the general solution to equation (2.21) is: 
 
𝐹(𝑉) =  𝐶1𝑉
𝜆1 + 𝐶2𝑉
𝜆2                                                             (2.24) 
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s.t.   𝐹(0) = 0 
        𝑉∗ − 𝐾 = 𝐶1𝑉∗
𝜆1 + 𝐶2𝑉∗
𝜆2 
        1 = 𝐶1𝜆1𝑉∗
𝜆1−1 + 𝐶2𝜆2𝑉∗
𝜆2−1 
 
To satisfy the boundary condition F(0) = 0, C1 must be zero, otherwise F(V) converges to infinity 
when V goes to zero and λ1 is negative. F(V) is then simply 𝐹(𝑉) = 𝐶2𝑉
𝜆2.   
 
Via the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, we are able to determine that the 
constant C2 is given by 𝐶2 =
𝑉∗
1−𝜆2
𝜆2
 and that the analytical solutions for the optimal investment 
threshold and the option value are respectively: 
 
𝑉∗ =
𝐾𝜆2
𝜆2−1
 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝜆2 > 1  𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑉∗ > 𝐾                                                 (2.25) 
𝐹(𝑉∗) = 𝑉∗ − 𝐾 =
𝐾
𝜆2−1
                                                               (2.26) 
 
The early exercise of the perpetual American option can happen once the value V is at least as 
large as the threshold 𝑉∗, where 𝑉∗ is higher than the strike price K.  
 
Similar to the analytical solution for the European call option in equation (2.17), the option value 
for the perpetual American call is dependent on the drift term of the underlying asset V, μV, and 
on the restriction on the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, k. Furthermore, the optimal 
investment threshold and the option value differ for the lower and the upper bound prices, 
leading to potentially different investment decisions depending on whether we have a long or a 
short position in the option (i.e., whether we are on the lower bound or on the upper bound).  
 
In a complete market, it is never optimal to exercise an American call option early if the 
underlying asset is a non-dividend paying asset. In an incomplete market, where the underlying 
asset of an option is either infrequently traded or non-traded such that we can no longer 
construct a replicating portfolio to price the option, things change. As Figure 2.5 shows, at the 
lower bound, the early exercise is triggered by the increase in the volatility of the underlying 
asset. The option value and the optimal investment threshold for the lower bound prices are 
both decreasing in the volatility of the underlying. At the upper bound, early exercise is never 
optimal, because the optimal investment threshold 𝑉∗ is always lower than the strike price K. 
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Figure 2.5: The lower bound optimal investment threshold and option value for different values of the 
volatility of the underlying asset. The parameter values are as follows: σS = 16%, μS = 8%, r = 4%, Sharpe 
ratio asset S = 0.25, k = 0.5, ρ = 0.8, V0 = 100, K = 60 and 𝜇𝑉 = 𝑟 + 𝜌
𝜎𝑉
𝜎𝑆
(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟).  
 
 
An increase in the volatility of the infrequently traded underlying asset means an increase in the 
unhedgeable sources of risk. Consequently, the economic agent is willing to pay less and less for 
the option, which explains the decreasing value, and exercises the option early to lock in value as 
long as it still exists. This result contradicts the standard options theory, but it is supported by 
the work of Henderson (2007) and Miao and Wang (2007), who also show via utility 
indifference pricing that early exercise is possible for an American call option in an incomplete 
market. However, utility indifference pricing involves more difficult calculations than the ones 
presented in this paper and, even though Henderson (2007) reaches closed-form solutions, the 
results of Miao and Wang (2007) are based on numerical methods.  
 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
We propose a pricing mechanism for contingent claims in incomplete markets using the model 
ambiguity concepts put forward by Hansen and Sargent (2001) and Andersen et al. (2003). We 
continue by analyzing the implications for a special case of a monotonically increasing payoff – 
the call option. We discuss European and American call options in incomplete markets and show 
that closed-form solutions are available in both cases. We document a negative relationship 
between the value of a European call option and the volatility of its underlying asset. 
Furthermore, we emphasize the early exercise feature that this negative relationship adds to an 
American call option even if the underlying asset is a non-dividend paying asset.  
 
We derive upper and lower bound prices for the option and show that in an incomplete market 
the lower bound prices (i.e., the buyer’s prices) decrease as the volatility of the underlying asset 
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increases. This is due to the increase in the unhedgeable sources of risk additional to the 
hedgeable risk that we find on a complete market and it contradicts standard option pricing 
theory. Furthermore, in an incomplete market where the underlying asset of an option is either 
infrequently traded or non-traded, early exercise of an American call option becomes possible at 
the lower bound. The option value and the optimal investment threshold for the lower bound 
prices are both decreasing in the volatility of the underlying. The economic agent exercises the 
option early to lock in value before it disappears as a result of increased unhedgeable risk.   
 
The advantage of the methodology we propose over other incomplete market techniques is that 
it arrives at closed-form solutions for the option price and, more importantly, comparable to the 
Black-Scholes (1973) price. Even though it is accessible and easy-to-implement, the difficult part 
of our approach remains the choice of k, which is the exogenous restriction on the total volatility 
of the stochastic discount factor.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The informational content of infinite maturity bonds2 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Pricing very long-dated cash flows has direct implications for life insurance companies and 
pension funds, because these financial institutions have contractual obligations that last far 
longer than any traded instrument we can find in the market. The purpose of this chapter is to 
give an answer to the following question: how does the market implicitly price very long-dated 
cash-flows? We compute theoretical prices for infinite maturity bonds and extract information 
about the long end of the term structure of interest rates from the difference between the 
market prices of UK infinite maturity bonds and their analytical prices.  
 
We show that infinite maturity bonds, in particular the War Loan, are a cheap investment. We 
find that they are generally underpriced, even though such investments should be attractive to 
large institutional investors. However, if that is indeed the case, then why does the mispricing 
persist given that this type of investors would be able to correct it? We show that the mispricing 
is mainly driven by volatility in financial markets and not by expectations of the economic 
outlook.  
 
The problem with pricing very long-dated cash flows is that the standard pricing method is 
pricing by replication (i.e., by replicating the cash flows of the asset to be valued with the cash 
flows of traded assets). However, the longest maturity government bonds traded in the market 
are 25-year or 30-year bonds. So, how can we then value assets with maturities beyond 30 
years? We are in fact in an incomplete market situation, where the presence of non-traded assets 
gives rise to more sources of randomness than there are traded assets to hedge them with 
(Björk, 2009). 
 
The focus of this chapter is infinite maturity bonds, or undated gilts, which are still traded in the 
UK. They were first issued in the 18th century and there are still eight such bonds in issue today, 
                                                          
2
 This is joint work with prof. dr. Antoon Pelsser. We are grateful for all the helpful comments we received from our 
colleagues at Maastricht University and the audience at the 2014 FMA European conference. We also thank NWO (the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) for the generous support in the form of a three-year grant via the 
Graduate Programme 2011 (correspondence number 011/08865/BOO).  
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some of them issued as early as the 19th century. These are the 31/2% Treasury Stock, the 23/4% 
Annuities, the 4% Consolidated Loan, the 21/2% Consolidated Stock, the 21/2% Treasury Stock, 
the 21/2% Annuities, the 31/2% Conversion Loan and the 31/2% War Loan. All bonds pay coupons 
either once, twice or four times per year.  
 
According to the UK Debt Management Office (DMO)3, the undated gilts currently represent less 
than 1% of the gilt market, with all but one of the undated gilts being rumps. A rump is a bond 
with a nominal amount outstanding that is less than ₤850 million. The War Loan, which was first 
issued in 1932, is the only infinite maturity bond considered to be non-rump. It is traded on the 
London Stock Exchange and it currently has a bit more than ₤1.9 billion in issue. Given that it has 
the largest volume and that it has been traded in the market for over 80 years, we will focus on 
this particular bond in our analysis.  
 
Our work adds to the literature documenting mispricings in government bond markets. There 
are two main strands of literature trying to explain this phenomenon. The first strand of 
literature attributes the mispricing to liquidity effects, which are best visible in off-the-run 
bonds and government agency bonds.   
 
Krishnamurthy (2002) looks at the difference in yields between on-the-run 30-year Treasury 
bonds and off-the-run 30-year Treasury bonds. The difference in yields is not negligible, as one 
would expect for identical bonds, and can best be explained by differences in liquidity. The 
reason is that 30-year Treasury bonds are auctioned roughly once every 6 months and, once a 
new bond of this type is issued, it becomes the more liquid one until the next auction when it is 
replaced by another bond with the same maturity and it will start to be seen as the less liquid 
one. The findings of Krishnamurthy (2002) are confirmed by Pasquariello and Vega (2009), who 
develop a theoretical trading model with heterogeneous agents who trade on-the-run and off-
the-run Treasury bonds in the presence of public signals (like macroeconomic announcements).  
Longstaff (2004) reports price differences between seemingly identical bonds in the government 
agency bond market. He compares the prices of Treasury zero-coupon bonds to the prices of 
Refcorp (Resolution Funding Corporation) zero-coupon bonds. Refcorp is a government agency 
created in 1989 to provide funding for the bailout of insolvent institutions after the US savings 
and loan crisis of the 1980s. Refcorp bonds and Treasury bonds have the same risk profile, 
because Refcorp bonds are guaranteed by the US Treasury, hence their prices should be equal. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
3 The DMO is the Government body responsible for the management of cash and sterling debt in the UK.  
CHAPTER 3: THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF INFINITE MATURITY BONDS 
 
29 
 
However, Longstaff (2004) finds a statistically and economically significant yield spread and 
concludes that it can only be attributed to liquidity.  
 
The second strand of literature explains the mispricing by the presence of slow moving capital 
(i.e., capital does not flow immediately where the mispricing is, because investors are somehow 
constrained). Mitchell et al. (2007) study such phenomena in convertible bond markets and in 
merger markets and find that, due to market frictions, it can take several months until the prices 
of convertible bonds and target stocks revert to equilibrium. They also conclude that, in markets 
where it is more difficult to estimate the level of the mispricing, it can take even longer to correct 
it. Duffie (2010) proposes a theoretical model of asset prices with inattentive investors, who fail 
to react immediately to demand or supply shocks. He also presents examples of slow moving 
capital in various markets and, like Mitchell et al. (2007), he concludes that it can take hours, 
days or even months until prices go back to their equilibrium levels.  
 
Fleckenstein et al. (2014) compare the price of a Treasury bond with the price of a synthetic 
Treasury bond with matching characteristics, obtained by converting the inflation-linked cash 
flows of Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) into fixed cash flows using inflation 
swaps. They find that Treasury bonds are consistently overpriced relative to TIPS and that the 
mispricing decreases when additional capital flows into the market, consistent with the slow-
moving capital explanation. Furthermore, the authors conclude that the Treasury-TIPS price 
differentials should not be used to imply market expectations of future inflation, as these 
expectations would be biased downwards, especially when financial markets are very volatile.  
 
Our work investigates the UK government bond market and documents yet another puzzle. Like 
Fleckenstein et al. (2014), we construct theoretical prices for the War Loan and compare them to 
the observed prices. We find that the War Loan is generally underpriced. Following Kempf et al. 
(2012), who determine the drivers of illiquidity premia in the German government bond market, 
we use economic and financial variables to establish what influences the mispricing in the UK 
market and conclude that it is mainly financial markets volatility.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the method we 
employ, Section 3.3 describes the UK market data used, Section 3.4 presents the results, Section 
3.5 continues with robustness checks and Section 3.6 concludes.  
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3.2. Method 
 
This paper documents a mispricing in the very long-term UK bond market - the infinite maturity 
bond market. We follow this mispricing from 2000 until 2013 and we show that it persists. The 
question is why. On the one hand, infinite maturity bonds would be the perfect long-term 
instrument to invest in for pension funds and insurance companies, but, if these large 
institutional investors did invest in infinite maturity bonds, the mispricing would disappear. On 
the other hand, if large institutional investors do not invest in these bonds, then they forgo 
potential profits. In the remainder of this paper, we first show that a mispricing exists and then 
we investigate the drivers of this mispricing.  
 
We focus our analysis on one of the eight UK infinite maturity bonds, the 3½% War Loan, 
because it is the most liquidly traded infinite maturity bond. We start by calculating a theoretical 
price for a bond with the characteristics of the War Loan: an infinite maturity bond, with a 
principal of ₤100 and which pays a ₤3.5 coupon semi-annually (i.e., ₤1.75 every 6 months).  
 
In order to determine the theoretical price, we must first extend the term structure of interest 
rates. Following Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Diebold and Li (2006), we calibrate a Nelson-
Siegel model to the observed yield curve and then extend the yield curve based on the parameter 
values resulting from the calibration. The yields of different maturities are computed with the 
formula:  
 
𝑦𝑡(𝑇) = 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡
1−𝑒−𝑇/𝜏𝑡
𝑇/𝜏𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝑡(
1−𝑒−𝑇/𝜏𝑡
𝑇/𝜏𝑡
− 𝑒−𝑇/𝜏𝑡)                                         (3.1) 
 
Having obtained the yields for all maturities, we then calculate the theoretical price of the 
infinite maturity bond as the sum of all discounted cash flows. We define the Spread as the 
difference between the observed price and the theoretical price of the War Loan. We repeat the 
procedure for every day in the sample and construct a time series of daily spreads for the period 
2000 – 2013.  
 
We show that the War Loan is consistently mispriced and that there is potential for profits by 
investing in UK infinite maturity bonds. Following Kempf et al. (2012), we determine what the 
financial and economic drivers of the Spread are. In particular, we use an error correction model 
to determine the short-run and long-run effects that stock market, bond market and economic 
outlook factors have on changes in the mispricing.  
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3.3. Data 
 
The data used in the analysis comes from four different sources: the DMO4, the Bank of England5, 
Datastream and the London Stock Exchange6. It spans over the time period 2000 – 2013 and it 
excludes weekends and holidays.  
 
First, we retrieve daily prices for the eight infinite maturity bonds from the DMO. The prices 
include the accrued interest and there are no tax benefits from owning these bonds. Second, we 
retrieve daily UK yield curves and the FTSE100 implied volatility index for maturities of 30 days 
from the Bank of England. Third, we use swaption volatilities from Datastream. A swaption (or 
swap option) is an option which gives the right to enter a fixed rate swap agreement at time Tn. A 
swaption is normally denoted Tn x (TN - Tn), where Tn is the expiry date of the option (and the 
start date of the underlying swap agreement) and (TN – Tn) is the tenor of the underlying swap. 
The longest maturity swaption volatilities available from 2000 are volatilities from 3 year option 
contracts on 10 year swap contracts. Last, due to the fact that there are no records of turnover 
data for any of the undated gilts, we retrieve turnover data for gilts with maturity longer than 15 
years from the London Stock Exchange. We use this measure as an indication of the liquidity in 
the long-term bond market. However, the turnover data is only available at monthly level and 
starting from 2006.  
 
To reduce the level of noise in the data, we aggregate all series at weekly level. Furthermore, 
when we introduce information that is available only at monthly level, we aggregate the rest of 
the data at monthly level as well.  
 
 
3.4. Results  
 
In this section, we discuss the results of our analysis. We argue that the UK infinite maturity 
bonds, in particular the War Loan, are a good long-term investment for insurance companies and 
pension funds, which have liabilities extending beyond the longest maturity instruments 
observed in the market. We show that the War Loan is underpriced compared to its theoretical 
price, making this bond a cheap long-term investment as well and that the mispricing is mainly 
driven by the volatility in the stock and in the bond market. Furthermore, we show that the War 
Loan implies a slightly upward sloping term structure of interest rates. Finally, we investigate 
                                                          
4 http://www.dmo.gov.uk/  
5 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
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how appropriate the use of the Nelson-Siegel (1987) model is in order to extend the term 
structure of interest rates and conclude that the results are not driven by the choice of term-
structure model.  
 
3.4.1. Calibration results 
 
We start the analysis by extending the term structure of interest rates in order to calculate 
theoretical prices for the UK infinite maturity bonds. We use the Nelson-Siegel (1987) 
specification in equation (3.1) to compute the daily yields needed to discount the cash flows 
corresponding to each bond. Following Diebold and Li (2006), we impose that τ is constant 
throughout the entire sample period and estimate the other three parameters by means of 
ordinary least squares. We obtain a value of 2.5987 for the constant τ. The results of the Nelson-
Siegel (1987) procedure are reported in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the calibrated parameters and the daily root mean squared errors for 
τ=2.5987 
  Mean St dev Min Median Max 
β0t 4.58 0.51 3.13 4.58 6.04 
β1t -1.67 2.52 -6.15 -0.91 2.71 
β2t -0.31 2.9 -7.23 0.42 7.28 
RMSE (in pp) 0.06 0.03 0.005 0.05 0.17 
 
 
A good check of the proper functioning of the Nelson-Siegel (1987) fit is to plot β0t against the 
longest-maturity extrapolated yield. According to equation (3.1), we should see that when T->∞ 
the long yields are approximately equal to β0t. This is shown in Figure 3.1. As expected, the 
values are almost identical throughout our sample period, suggesting that the calibrated value of 
2.5987 for the constant parameter τ is a reasonable value given the observed data.  
 
Having obtained the parameters in equation (3.1), we can calculate daily yields for all maturities, 
determine the theoretical bond prices and compute the Spread, the difference between the 
observed price and the theoretical price, for all eight UK undated gilts. Even though the analysis 
will focus on the War Loan as the most liquidly traded undated gilt, we plot the evolution of the 
Spread for all eight undated gilts in Figure 3.2. The theoretical price is computed in each case 
using the corresponding coupon payments and coupon frequencies.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/home/homepage.htm 
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Figure 3.1: The longest-maturity yield extrapolated with Nelson-Siegel (1987) against β0t for each day in the 
time period 2000 – 2013.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 reveals similar patterns: the bonds are generally underpriced (a negative value means 
that the observed price is lower than the theoretical price), with the mispricing being persistent 
throughout the sample period 2000 – 2013. In fact, the consistent mispricing leads us to believe 
that there is a potential for profits by investing in these bonds, especially the War Loan, which 
can be traded on the London Stock Exchange. The question is what drives the mispricing? To 
answer it, we follow Kempf et al. (2012) and search for economic and financial variables that 
could influence the Spread.  
 
3.4.2. The determinants of the mispricing 
 
In this sub-section, we use an error correction model to disentangle potential short and long-
term effects of economic and financial variables on changes in the Spread, which from now on 
will only refer to the difference between the observed and the theoretical price of the War Loan. 
We think there are two types of factors that could impact the price of undated gilts: expectations 
about the economic outlook and financial markets characteristics. We now explain in more detail 
our choice of independent variables.  
 
First, following Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998), we use the 
slope of the yield curve, defined as the difference between the 10-year yield and the 3-month 
yield, as a predictor of future economic activity. We call this variable Slope and convert the daily 
values into weekly averages.  
 
Second, we use two forward-looking measures of stock market and bond market volatility: the 
implied volatility from FTSE100 options with 30 days to maturity and the implied volatility from  
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Figure 3.2: The evolution of the Spread, the absolute difference between the observed price and the 
theoretical price, for each of the eight UK infinite maturity bonds. The principal is always ₤100.  
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at-the-money swaptions with a 3-year option maturity and a 10-year swap maturity (longer 
maturity swaption contracts were not available as early as 2000). We call these variables 
VolStocks and VolBonds, respectively. We average both series of daily values at weekly level.  
 
Third, given that our interest lies in long-maturity bonds, we expect the volatility of the last 
observed yield to play a role in subsequent changes in the Spread. On the UK market, the last 
observed yield is the 25-year yield. Hence, we construct weekly standard deviations of this 
variable and call it VolLastYield.  
  
Last, we need an indication of the liquidity in the infinite maturity bond market. Unfortunately, 
no such information is available. We do however have access to turnover data for bonds with 
more than 15 years of maturity. This information is provided by the London Stock exchange on a 
monthly basis and starting from 2006. We use the natural logarithm of the turnover, which is 
expressed in ₤million, and call this series LogTurnover.  
 
Descriptive statistics of all the variables defined above can be found in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of the series used in the analysis 
  Availability Frequency Obs Mean Std dev Min Median Max 
Spread 2000 - 2013 Weekly 731 -2.27 4.15 -17.20 -1.17 6.02 
Slope 2000 - 2013 Weekly 731 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04 
VolStocks 2000 - 2013 Weekly 731 0.21 0.09 0.10 0.19 0.68 
VolBonds 2000 - 2013 Weekly 731 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.30 
VolLastYield 2000 - 2013 Weekly 731 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.27 
LogTurnover 2006 - 2013 Monthly 96 25.12 0.49 24.29 25.02 27.94 
 
 
We start our analysis by regressing changes in Spread on lagged values and changes in the slope 
of the yield curve, the implied volatilities from FTSE100 options and swaptions and the volatility 
of the last observed yield. The results are presented in Table 3.3. Columns (1) through (3) 
progressively introduce more lags and use weekly level data during the time period 2000 – 
2013. The results suggest that the future economic outlook, proxied by the slope of the yield 
curve, does not have an influence on the mispricing of the War Loan, whereas the volatility on 
the stock market has a positive impact and the volatility on the bond market, including the 
volatility in the last observed yield, have a negative impact on the observed mispricing. In the 
short run, an increase in the stock market volatility leads to an increase in the Spread (or in the 
mispricing), while an increase in the bond market volatility leads to a decrease in the mispricing. 
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Table 3.3: Error correction model explaining changes in Spread. All variables are defined in Section 3.4.2. The 
t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  ΔSpreadt   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Spreadt-1 -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.202*** 
 (-4.27) (-4.16) (-3.67) (-2.96) 
Slopet-1 3.201* 2.790 2.715 19.134* 
 (1.67) (1.44) (1.40) (1.93) 
VolStockst-1 0.670** 0.815*** 0.643** 8.583** 
 (2.58) (2.96) (2.23) (2.47) 
VolBondst-1 -1.852*** -1.703*** -1.634*** -11.344*** 
 (-3.40) (-3.09) (-2.95) (-2.78) 
VolLastYieldt-1 -2.932** -3.229** -3.041** -4.820 
 (-2.54) (-2.34) (-1.98) (-0.78) 
LogTurnovert-1    -0.101 
    (-0.20) 
ΔSlopet -1.930 -0.659 -1.642 -69.603 
 (-0.08) (-0.03) (-0.07) (-1.00) 
ΔVolStockst 2.271*** 2.128*** 2.190*** 5.807** 
 (2.95) (2.75) (2.84) (2.01) 
ΔVolBondst -13.057*** -10.890** -10.815** -28.601* 
 (-2.67) (-2.18) (-2.14) (-1.82) 
ΔVolLastYieldt -2.026** -1.990** -2.088** 0.689 
 (-2.33) (-2.29) (-2.41) (0.18) 
ΔLogTurnovert    0.147 
    (0.61) 
ΔSlopet-1  -1.476 -11.409 -6.734 
  (-0.06) (-0.45) (-0.09) 
ΔVolStockst-1  -0.443 -0.268 -1.594 
  (-0.57) (-0.34) (-0.50) 
ΔVolBondst-1  -10.525** -12.205** -26.832* 
  (-2.10) (-2.39) (-1.67) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-1  0.420 -0.036 9.466** 
  (0.48) (-0.03) (2.00) 
ΔLogTurnovert-1    0.342 
    (1.00) 
ΔSlopet-2   27.750 -48.967 
   (1.15) (-0.73) 
ΔVolStockst-2   1.349* 0.532 
   (1.74) (0.18) 
ΔVolBondst-2   3.955 -3.284 
   (0.79) (-0.23) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-2   -0.628 3.854 
   (-0.72) (1.18) 
ΔLogTurnovert-2    0.128 
    (0.52) 
Constant 0.203** 0.166* 0.187** 2.613 
 (2.22) (1.79) (2.00) (0.21) 
     
Observations 730 729 728 93 
R2 0.064 0.075 0.077 0.358 
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The effects are not persistent, except for the implied volatility from swaptions, which still 
influences the Spread up to one lag. The results suggest that, when there is high volatility on the 
UK stock market, investors prefer bonds, but they only turn to infinite maturity bonds when 
other type of bonds seem too risky (i.e., when there is high volatility on the bond market). This 
might explain the plot of the War Loan Spread in Figure 3.2 and why the War Loan was not 
underpriced during the crisis period 2008-2009 and its aftermath 2010-2011.  
 
We are aware of the fact that low liquidity in the infinite maturity bond market could be the 
cause of the observed mispricing. Unfortunately, neither bid-ask spreads nor trading volume 
data are available for the War Loan. Instead, starting from 2006, we have access to monthly level 
turnover data for gilts with maturity longer than 15 years. Column (4) of Table 3.3 adds the 
variable LogTurnover to the error correction model of Column (3). It seems that the turnover of 
long-maturity gilts does not impact our measure of the mispricing at all. However, we cannot 
rule out liquidity effects from our story, given the rough approximation we employ for the 
liquidity in the War Loan market.  
 
We continue with a sub-sample analysis of the error correction model in Column (3) of Table 3.3, 
which is meant to establish whether or not the Spread reacts differently to the chosen economic 
and financial variables in different time periods. We split our sample into three time periods 
with equal number of observations and report the results in Table 3.4. We also tried splitting the 
sample into four equally-spaced time periods and we obtained similar results.  
 
Table 3.4 confirms the previous results of the whole-sample analysis. Most variables retain their 
signs and statistical significance. The only difference appears in the slope of the yield curve, 
which is now statistically significant in the short run in the first and last sub-period. Before the 
financial crisis, an increase in the slope of the yield curve lead to an increase in the mispricing of 
the War Loan, whereas after the crisis a change in the slope of the yield curve has the opposite 
effect. An increase in the slope of the yield curve is an indication of improved expectations of 
future economic activity. We argue that this change in the behavior of the mispricing in response 
to changes in Slope is due to an increased interest of investors in the War Loan after the financial 
crisis compared to the period before the crisis, when better economic prospects would prompt 
one towards the stock market and make them lose interest in the bond market, especially in the 
infinite maturity bond market.   
 
Overall, our results show that the mispricing of the War Loan is driven by volatility in the 
financial markets. Another explanation could be though the slow-moving capital hypothesis put  
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Table 3.4: Error correction model with weekly level data explaining changes in Spread for sub-samples 2000-
2004, 2004-2009, 2009-2013. All variables are defined in Section 3.4.2. The t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  ΔSpreadt  
 2000-2004 2004-2009 2009-2013 
    
Spreadt-1 -0.035** -0.070*** -0.037** 
 (-2.45) (-3.02) (-2.14) 
Slopet-1 2.214 -13.216 -20.098 
 (0.30) (-1.38) (-1.23) 
VolStockst-1 0.311 2.065*** 0.804 
 (0.66) (3.27) (0.84) 
VolBondst-1 4.672 2.934 -6.956** 
 (1.26) (0.71) (-2.18) 
VolLastYieldt-1 -13.145*** -0.364 -0.777 
 (-3.37) (-0.12) (-0.28) 
ΔSlopet 87.183* -23.290 -95.740** 
 (1.67) (-0.66) (-2.01) 
ΔVolStockst 4.284*** 0.679 3.235** 
 (3.01) (0.56) (2.07) 
ΔVolBondst -16.766 6.277 -21.990*** 
 (-1.12) (0.56) (-3.23) 
ΔVolLastYieldt -7.358*** -0.562 -0.071 
 (-3.91) (-0.38) (-0.05) 
ΔSlopet-1 -59.498 7.246 21.805 
 (-1.16) (0.20) (0.45) 
ΔVolStockst-1 -0.896 -3.588*** 2.499 
 (-0.63) (-2.83) (1.52) 
ΔVolBondst-1 10.846 -37.077*** -9.985 
 (0.72) (-3.49) (-1.47) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-1 4.655* -3.052 2.568 
 (1.70) (-1.47) (1.33) 
ΔSlopet-2 25.430 20.892 72.315 
 (0.52) (0.59) (1.52) 
ΔVolStockst-2 3.734*** 1.853 -2.533 
 (2.63) (1.44) (-1.62) 
ΔVolBondst-2 2.007 -6.814 10.125 
 (0.14) (-0.65) (1.49) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-2 0.773 -3.991*** 2.451* 
 (0.40) (-2.75) (1.80) 
Constant -0.344 -0.753 1.779* 
 (-0.70) (-1.34) (1.74) 
    
Observations 241 241 240 
R2 0.168 0.223 0.190 
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forward by Mitchell et al. (2007), Duffie (2010) and Fleckenstein et al. (2014). However, we are 
confident we can reject this explanation. Investor under-reaction seems very unlikely given that 
we observe the mispricing for much longer periods of time (i.e., years) than ever documented in 
any of the previous literature.  
 
We also consider the possibility of measurement error introduced with the use of the Nelson-
Siegel (1987) fit. However, as Diebold and Li (2006) suggest, such pricing errors are persistent 
and, even though the prices constructed using a term structure model will never be exactly equal 
to the observed bond prices due to tax and liquidity effects, they will disappear when using price 
changes. We conduct our analysis with changes in the mispricing, which will no longer contain 
any measurement error, but only the actual mispricing.  
 
3.4.3. Implied long-term discount rate  
 
Apart from providing a good long-term investment at a cheap price, the War Loan could also be a 
source of valuable information regarding the long end of the term structure of interest rates. In 
particular, this infinite maturity bond could give an indication of how the market implicitly 
prices cash flows beyond traded maturities.  
 
We conduct the following exercise. Using the observed term structure, we subtract the present 
value of the first 25 years of cash flows from the observed War Loan price. We then assume a 
constant long-term discount rate and imply this discount rate from the remaining value, which is 
always a positive value. The result of this exercise can be seen in Figure 3.3, where we plot the 
implied long-term discount rate against the 25-year rate, which is the last observed interest rate. 
The War Loan tells us that the long-term discount rate tracks the evolution of the last observed 
rate very closely. Furthermore, it implies a slightly upward sloping term structure of interest 
rates beyond traded maturities, given that the long-term discount rate is always above the 25-
year rate. We should bear in mind though that our long-term discount rate is generally 
overstated due to the tendency of the War Loan to be underpriced.  
 
We are now also presented with the opportunity to test the existence and the determinants of 
the mispricing in the War Loan without the influence of the Nelson-Siegel (1987) model. 
Without making any assumptions about the extension of the term structure of interest rates, the 
difference between the 25-year rate and the implied long-term discount rate is another 
representation of the Spread presented in the upper left corner of Figure 3.1. We call this 
difference YieldSpread and re-run the error correction model in Column (3) of Table 3.3 in order 
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to explain changes in the YieldSpread instead of the Spread variable. We present the results in 
Table 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.3: The implied long-term discount rate against the 25-year interest rate  
 
 
Similar to the Spread, the YieldSpread is positively influenced by the volatility in the stock 
market and negatively influenced by the volatility in the bond market, with the effect of the 
implied volatility on the bond market persisting up to one lag. However, the volatility in the last 
observed yield is statistically insignificant. The results in Table 3.5 coincide with our previous 
findings, but, most importantly, they show that the mispricing of the War Loan and its 
determinants are not an artifact of the Nelson-Siegel (1987) model. The mispricing of the War 
Loan is indeed a result of a series of financial variables and it is not triggered by the future 
economic prospects.  
 
 
3.5. Mispricing or option value? 
 
The UK undated gilts have two unique features: they have infinite maturity and they can be 
redeemed by the issuer (i.e., the Government) at any point in time, meaning that these gilts have 
an embedded American option feature. Some of the undated gilts can be redeemed on a payment 
date, while others, like the War Loan, require at least three months’ notice in the London 
Gazette.  
 
We acknowledge the fact that a component of the observed mispricing is the embedded option 
value of the War Loan. The methodology of how one could calculate the price of the bond with  
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Table 3.5: Error correction model with weekly level data explaining changes in YieldSpread. YieldSpread is 
the difference between the last observed yield and the implied long-term discount rate. All other variables are 
defined in Section 3.4.2. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 ΔYieldSpreadt 
  
YieldSpreadt-1 -0.019*** 
 (-3.21) 
Slopet-1 -0.00002 
 (-0.02) 
VolStockst-1 0.0004** 
 (2.24) 
VolBondst-1 -0.001*** 
 (-3.09) 
VolLastYieldt-1 -0.002 
 (-1.58) 
ΔSlopet -0.018 
 (-1.15) 
ΔVolStockst 0.001*** 
 (2.66) 
ΔVolBondst -0.004 
 (-1.24) 
ΔVolLastYieldt -0.002*** 
 (-2.65) 
ΔSlopet-1 -0.014 
 (-0.83) 
ΔVolStockst-1 0.0004 
 (0.78) 
ΔVolBondst-1 -0.006* 
 (-1.79) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-1 -0.0003 
 (-0.45) 
ΔSlopet-2 0.005 
 (0.33) 
ΔVolStockst-2 -0.0001 
 (-0.32) 
ΔVolBondst-2 0.001 
 (0.25) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-2 -0.0001 
 (-0.21) 
Constant 0.0001** 
 (2.02) 
  
Observations 728 
R2 0.056 
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the embedded American option is presented in the Appendix. However, the option value cannot 
account for the entire magnitude of the effect. 
 
All eight undated gilts differ only by coupon rate and liquidity. In a low interest rate 
environment, the option value of a 3½% infinite maturity coupon bond is higher than the option 
value of a 2½% infinite maturity coupon bond, making the higher-coupon bond less valuable 
than the lower-coupon bond and its underpricing less severe. Based on the data in Figure 3.2, the 
left panel of Figure 3.4 shows that this is not always the case, for instance in the beginning and 
end periods of our time series when long-term interest rates are at relatively low levels. 
Similarly, infinite maturity bonds with the same coupon rate should have the same option value, 
but the right panel of Figure 3.4 shows that the level of mispricing differs for two bonds with the 
same coupon rate. Furthermore, the presence of the embedded option value does not explain 
why the War Loan is sometimes overpriced compared to the theoretical price. When the option 
value is low, as in the time period 2008-2010 when long-term interest rates are at relatively high 
levels, the theoretical price should be a good approximation of the observed market price and no 
mispricing should be visible anymore. 
 
Figure 3.4: Comparison of the different Spread measures among undated gilts 
 
 
 
 
 
The level of the long-term interest rates can be seen as a proxy for option value: the lower the 
interest rates fall the higher the option value becomes. We add the level of the last observed 
yield, which we denote by LastYield, to the specification in Column (3) of Table 3.3 and present 
the results in Table 3.6. The results show that indeed the level of the last observed yield has a 
positive effect on the Spread in the short run, suggesting that the option value explains part of 
the mispricing, but it does not eliminate the influence of the volatility on the stock market and on 
the bond market nor does it invalidate our previous findings. 
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Table 3.6: Error correction model explaining changes in Spread. LastYield is the level of the last observed 
yield (i.e., the 25-year yield). All other variables are defined in Section 3.4.2. The t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 ΔSpreadt 
  
Spreadt-1 -0.021*** 
 (-3.65) 
Slopet-1 3.637 
 (1.46) 
VolStockst-1 0.866*** 
 (2.90) 
VolBondst-1 -2.143** 
 (-2.04) 
VolLastYieldt-1 -3.501** 
 (-2.29) 
LastYieldt-1 -0.067 
 (-0.68) 
ΔSlopet -83.720*** 
 (-2.67) 
ΔVolStockst 2.226*** 
 (2.90) 
ΔVolBondst -3.667 
 (-0.68) 
ΔVolLastYieldt -2.306*** 
 (-2.68) 
ΔLastYieldt 1.628*** 
 (4.09) 
ΔSlopet-1 -11.331 
 (-0.34) 
ΔVolStockst-1 -0.582 
 (-0.75) 
ΔVolBondst-1 -9.648* 
 (-1.78) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-1 0.060 
 (0.05) 
ΔLastYieldt-1 0.207 
 (0.52) 
ΔSlopet-2 43.921 
 (1.41) 
ΔVolStockst-2 1.443* 
 (1.87) 
ΔVolBondst-2 3.972 
 (0.74) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-2 -0.596 
 (-0.69) 
ΔLastYieldt-2 -0.022 
 (-0.06) 
Constant 0.523 
 (0.96) 
  
Observations 728 
R2 0.101 
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Given all the reasons mentioned above, we conclude that, even though the option value can 
partly explain the documented mispricing in the War Loan, it cannot account for the patterns 
entirely.   
 
 
3.6. Robustness test 
 
As a robustness test, we search for a different measure to proxy for the economic outlook 
instead of the slope of the term structure of interest rates. We use the Economic Sentiment 
Indicator, a monthly indicator provided by Eurostat7. We retrieve the Economic Sentiment 
Indicator data both at EU and UK level for the time period 2000 – 2013. 
 
The Economic Sentiment Indicator is a survey-based measure of economic prospects. It is 
comprised of five confidence indicators with different weights: the industrial confidence 
indicator, the services confidence indicator, the consumer confidence indicator, the construction 
confidence indicator and the retail trade confidence indicator. The Economic Sentiment 
Indicator is calculated as an index with mean value of 100 and standard deviation of 10 over a 
fixed standardized sample period.  
 
We re-run the error correction model in Column (3) of Table 3.3, this time replacing the Slope 
variable first with the Economic Sentiment at EU level and then with the Economic Sentiment at 
UK level. We aggregate all data on a monthly basis and present the results in Table 3.7. 
 
Similar to the findings in Section 3.4.2., the economic prospects have no influence on the 
mispricing of the War Loan. Furthermore, the use of the Economic Sentiment Indicator does not 
change the impact the volatility of the stock market and of the bond market has on the Spread. 
We still observe a positive relationship between VolStocks and Spread and a negative 
relationship between VolBonds and Spread. Similar to the results in Table 3.3, the implied 
volatility from swaptions is persistent and influences the Spread up to one lag. However, the 
volatility of the last observed yield, VolLastYield, becomes insignificant.  
 
We conclude that Table 3.7 supports the previous evidence, leading us to believe that our results 
are not driven by the particular choice of variables and that we indeed capture the drivers of the 
mispricing we document for the War Loan. 
                                                          
7 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ 
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Table 3.7: Error correction model with monthly level data explaining changes in Spread during the time 
period 2000 – 2013. EcSentEU and EcSentUK are the Economic Sentiment Indicators at EU and UK level 
respectively, provided by Eurostat. All other variables are defined in Section 3.4.2. The t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 ΔSpreadt  
 (1) (2) 
   
Spreadt-1 -0.078*** -0.081*** 
 (-3.19) (-3.44) 
EcSentEUt-1 0.008  
 (0.63)  
EcSentUKt-1 
 
VolStockst-1 
 
 
3.827** 
0.003 
(0.22) 
3.557** 
 (2.57) (2.46) 
VolBondst-1 -4.188* -4.826** 
 (-1.90) (-2.46) 
VolLastYieldt-1 -3.765 -4.287 
 (-0.87) (-0.94) 
ΔEcSentEUt 0.023  
 (0.40)  
ΔEcSentUKt 
 
ΔVolStockst 
 
 
6.326*** 
0.024 
(0.96) 
6.250*** 
 (3.36) (3.36) 
ΔVolBondst -17.148* -17.686* 
 (-1.78) (-1.88) 
ΔVolLastYieldt 0.419 0.201 
 (0.16) (0.08) 
ΔEcSentEUt-1 0.055  
 (1.03)  
ΔEcSentUKt-1 
 
ΔVolStockst-1 
 
 
0.546 
0.012 
(0.47) 
0.167 
 (0.29) (0.09) 
ΔVolBondst-1 -17.468* -17.309* 
 (-1.80) (-1.82) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-1 6.860* 6.690* 
 (1.86) (1.81) 
ΔEcSentEUt-2 -0.037  
 (-0.69)  
ΔEcSentUKt-2 
 
ΔVolStockst-2 
 
 
-1.106 
-0.019 
(-0.78) 
-1.437 
 (-0.60) (-0.78) 
ΔVolBondst-2 9.931 10.013 
 (1.02) (1.07) 
ΔVolLastYieldt-2 2.924 2.906 
 (1.15) (1.14) 
Constant -0.745 -0.057 
 (-0.43) (-0.03) 
   
Observations 165 165 
R2 0.294 0.294 
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3.7. Conclusion 
 
We document a mispricing in the UK infinite maturity bond market. We compare observed 
market prices to theoretical bond prices in order to extract information about the long end of the 
term structure of interest rates. We show that UK infinite maturity bonds and in particular the 
War Loan are generally underpriced and that the mispricing is mainly driven by volatility in the 
financial markets. Furthermore, we show that the War Loan implies a slightly upward term 
structure of interest rates.  
 
The question remains though: why does the mispricing persist? One would expect that large 
institutional investors like pension funds and insurance companies would be interested in such 
long-term investments, eliminating the mispricing. However, it seems that they in fact do not 
invest in these instruments given the persistent mispricing, in which case they leave money on 
the table.  
 
 
3.8. Appendix 
 
The War Loan can be redeemed by the government at any point in time. If the issuer decides to 
buy back the War Loan, the bond holders receive ₤100 plus the value of the coupon. To 
incorporate this American option feature in the pricing mechanism, we can calibrate a 1-factor 
Hull-White (1990) model to market swaption prices. The parameter values resulting from the 
calibration can then be used as inputs for a finite difference pricing method in order to price the 
bond option.  
 
In the Hull-White (1990) model, the dynamics of the short interest rate under the risk-neutral 
measure Q are given by: 
 
𝑑𝑟 = [𝜃(𝑡) − 𝑎𝑟]𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑤                                                            (3.A1) 
 
ϴ is a deterministic function of time, a is a constant mean-reversion parameter and σ is a 
constant volatility parameter. 
 
There is no closed-form solution for the price of a swaption in the Hull-White (1990) model. In 
the absence of an analytical formula, the Jamshidian (1989) decomposition can be used to 
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compute the price of a swaption, by writing the option on a coupon bond as a sum of N options 
on the underlying zero-coupon bonds8. This decomposition can be applied, because the price of a 
swaption is equivalent to the price of a put option on a coupon bond with strike price equal to 1.  
 
Given that there is no analytical formula for an American bond option, the calibrated parameters 
a and σ are used as inputs for an explicit finite difference method to calculate the price of an 
infinite maturity bond with the characteristics of the War Loan. The time-zero price of the bond 
option is computed via a backwards recursive procedure, knowing that at every node of the grid 
there is a trade-off between the continuation value and the prepayment value of the bond. If 
market interest rates are low, it is cheaper for the government to prepay the bond. However, if 
market interest rates are high, it is better for the government to continue paying the semi-
annual coupons to the bond holders. The early exercise of the American option takes place only 
at the time points when coupon payments are made. Details of the finite difference method can 
be found in Pelsser (2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 This holds for all one-factor term structure models and for all applications where the components of the portfolio 
are monotonic functions of the same state variable.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The role of corporate political contributions in the allocation 
of government procurements9 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
There is growing concern that politics and business are becoming more and more intertwined, 
to the point that political decisions are not made in the interest of the voters anymore but in the 
interest of the most well-connected company. For instance, in the beginning of September 2014, 
the media was reporting that former US Republican Congressman Eric Cantor will join Wall 
Street boutique investment bank Moelis & Co. as vice chairman and board member for a 
compensation of $3.4 million in order to help Moelis & Co. navigate difficult terrain in 
Washington. Cantor was House Majority Leader from 2011 until his resignation from Congress 
in August 2014, after having lost the Republican primary election. According to the Center for 
Responsive Politics10, during his political career, Cantor raised most contributions money from 
companies in the securities and investment industry.  
 
Is this example a mere coincidence or does it hint at the nature of the relationship between 
politicians and the private sector? Does Moelis & Co. stand to gain anything from the 
government by hiring someone with inside knowledge of Washington? It could be that the 
company is seeking easier access to government contracts. Alternatively, Moelis & Co. might be 
hoping for increased support when lobbying for favorable legislation. This is another example of 
an incomplete market situation. The activity of companies is affected by the political decisions 
made in the country they operate in. However, one cannot trade in political decisions hence the 
market for political risk is incomplete. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the connection between corporate political 
contributions and the allocation of government procurement contracts. We compile 
comprehensive information on all S&P500 companies in the time span 1993 – 2010 and provide 
                                                          
9 This is joint work with prof. dr. Piet Eichholtz. We are thankful to our colleagues at Maastricht University for 
valuable feedback and to NWO (the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) for the generous support in the 
form of a three-year grant via the Graduate Programme 2011 (correspondence number 2011/08865/BOO).  
10 http://www.opensecrets.org/  
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an overview of the contributing behavior around congressional election campaigns and the 
implications on the subsequent allocation of procurement contracts.  
 
We find that making a contribution can increase the chances of receiving a procurement contract 
in the next period. To maximize the future procurement value, companies should contribute to a 
large number of candidates taking part in Congressional races and preferably to candidates of 
the Republican Party. Furthermore, we show that the effects of contributions vary depending on 
the industry the company belongs to. In some industries, companies can use contributions as a 
tool in the competition for government contracts, while in others contributions have no effect on 
the subsequent procurement value, suggesting that the contributions’ purpose is different there, 
perhaps directed at insuring against unfavorable legislation.  
 
Our work is closely related to the work of Witko (2011), Goldman et al. (2013) and Tahoun 
(2014), who relate political affiliations to the allocation of government procurement contracts. 
Witko (2011) tracks all PACs in continuous existence between 1979 – 2006, regardless of 
whether the affiliated company is public or private, and relates their contributing behavior to 
the number of government contracts received. He finds that the more money a company 
contributes the more government contracts the company receives. Goldman et al. (2013) look at 
the effects of the change in control in the House and the Senate after the 1994 election and find 
that companies with boards politically connected to the winning party experience an increase in 
the value of the procurement contracts after the election. However, contributions made by firms 
to the 1994 election campaign do not have a significant effect in this setting. Tahoun (2014) 
relates the shares of S&P500 firms held by members of Congress in the time frame 2004 - 2007 
to the corporate political contributions made by these firms - as gains for the politicians - and 
the government contracts received by these firms - as gains for the firms. He finds that US 
members of Congress invest more in firms which contribute to election campaigns compared to 
the rest and that firms which exhibit this type of associations receive more government 
contracts.  
 
This chapter contributes to the work of Witko (2011), Goldman et al. (2013) and Tahoun (2014) 
by establishing a clear relationship between political contributions and the allocation of 
procurement contracts. As opposed to Tahoun (2014), who analyzes the politician-firm 
relationship from the perspective of the politician, we focus on the firm as the decision maker 
and, contrary to the results of Goldman et al. (2013), we find that contributions play a central 
role in the allocation of procurement contracts. We ask the question whether or not it is 
worthwhile for firms to contribute and how exactly they stand to gain from it. We find that firms 
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can benefit from contributing to election campaigns by increasing their chances to be awarded a 
procurement contract in the next period. The difference in results compared to Goldman et al. 
(2013) is likely driven by the fact that we use a much longer time span to capture these effects.  
Even though the literature related to the allocation of procurement contracts is limited, the 
literature on political contributions is quite extensive and it spans two main strands. The first 
strand of literature documents the process of contributing to election campaigns via political 
action committees (PACs). Grier and Munger (1991) and Stratmann (1992) find that PACs target 
congressional committees that they believe might serve their interests and that incumbents, 
especially in close election races, are most receptive to these contributions. Additionally, 
Kroszner and Stratmann (2005) find that congressional committee members receive more 
contributions when they are higher ranked in the committee and make clear which interests 
they support.  
 
Stratmann (1995) finds that contributions made around the time of a vote are more important 
than contributions received at the last election. Snyder (1990) documents the fact that 
candidates in election races try to attract as many contributions from PACs as possible, even 
though Ansolabehere et al. (2003) show that most contributions come from individuals and not 
from PACs, while Milyo et al. (2000) show that corporate PACs in particular spend more money 
on lobbying activities than on campaign contributions. Bombardini and Trebbi (2011) show that 
PACs interact with politicians by promising not only monetary contributions for election 
campaigns but also votes. If the size of the interest group the PAC represents is large enough, 
then the voter representation can be quite significant. The authors find a concave relationship 
between monetary contributions and votes: once the votes promised by a PAC to a legislator are 
numerous enough, the contribution value needed to ensure the future support of the legislator 
starts to decrease.  
 
Contribution limits in place during the sample period affect both the election races and the PACs 
themselves. Stratmann et al. (2006) show that these limits lead to increased competition and 
closer races with less of an advantage for incumbents. Drazen et al. (2007) talk about a reduced 
advantage of richer PACs over poorer PACs, even though the exact opposite could also happen: 
richer PACs increase their bargaining power even more.  
 
The second strand of literature relates political contributions to firm performance. Claessen et 
al. (2008) use a panel of Brazilian election data to show that firms which contribute to election 
campaigns benefit from easier subsequent access to bank finance. Goldman et al. (2009) and 
Cooper et al. (2010) show that firms can experience positive abnormal returns either by having 
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politically connected board members or by making contributions to election campaigns, 
especially if they contribute to candidates located in the same state as the firm. Ovtchinnikov 
and Pantaleoni (2012) find that even individual contributions to election campaigns are 
beneficial for firms, especially in difficult economic times, if individuals target legislators who 
can influence the economic well-being in a certain area or industry. Hong and Kostovetsky 
(2012) and Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) show that more support to the Democrat party is 
associated with lower investments by mutual funds in stocks of socially irresponsible companies 
and with higher corporate social responsibility ratings, respectively.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data used. Section 
4.3 presents the empirical analysis and the results. Section 4.4 discusses the findings and 
concludes.  
 
 
4.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Our aim is to find the effect that campaign contributions made by S&P500 companies have on 
the probability that these companies receive government contracts in the following period and, 
if there is indeed an effect, we want to know how large it is. To this end, we compile company 
level data from three different sources: political contributions during congressional elections 
from the Federal Election Commission (FEC), government procurements data from the Federal 
Procurement Data System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG) and company financials from 
COMPUSTAT. We obtain yearly information on S&P500 companies from these sources for the 
time period 1993 – 2010. Our sample starts in 1993, when the congressional committees (i.e., 
the committees making up the US House of Representatives and the Senate) in their current 
form were established, and it ends in 2010, when the Citizens United act was passed, eliminating 
some of the restrictions on the amounts of contributions and potentially modifying the 
contributing behavior.  
 
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is an independent regulatory agency whose role is to 
enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, in particular to disclose all 
information on campaign finance during federal elections and to ensure that the limits on 
contributions imposed by law are not broken. The FEC gathers information from all federal 
elections for the US Congress as well as presidential elections and it reports contributions made 
by both individuals and political action committees. A political action committee (PAC) is an 
entity organized for the specific purpose of raising and spending money in order to elect or 
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defeat candidates. According to the FEC, a PAC can be affiliated to a corporation, a labor 
organization, a membership organization, a trade association, a cooperative or a corporation 
without capital stock.  
 
 We focus on the activity of corporate PACs during congressional elections. Congressional 
elections take place every two years, which means that an election cycle, which is the period of 
time during which an elected candidate exerts his term and contributions can be made for the 
next election, lasts for two years. Corporations are not allowed to make contributions to election 
campaigns, but their PACs are. According to the FEC rules, a PAC can receive repeated 
contributions for the same candidate or for multiple candidates, as long as the contributions do 
not exceed $5,000 per year from one contributor. Furthermore, a PAC can contribute a 
maximum of $5,000 per candidate per election, where each primary, general, runoff and special 
election in House and Senate races is treated as a separate election with separate contribution 
limits. A corporate PAC can only accept contributions from managers and stockholders and their 
families and it is not allowed to seek contributions from other employee categories. We 
aggregate all the reported contributions at company level.  
 
The Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG) is a government database 
that comprises information on all procurements, with a value higher than $3,000, contracted by 
the US Government. A procurement contract is a contract to sell goods and services to the 
government. The information in this database is public and it refers to the name of the company 
providing the goods and services, the total value of the procurement and the contracting agency 
of the US Government.  
 
The company financials are retrieved from COMPUSTAT. We use yearly information on total 
assets (including cash holdings), the book-to-market ratio (measured as the book value per 
share divided by the end-of-year market price per share), total debt (measured as the sum of 
long term debt and debt in current liabilities), total dividends (i.e. common and preferred), 
capital expenditures (or Capex) and the cost of goods sold (or Cogs).  
 
The data gathering process is carried out as follows. First, we identify all the names of the 
S&P500 companies in the time span 1993-2010. We track company name changes using the 
EDGAR online database provided by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Second, 
we match the company names to the names listed in the political contributions files of the FEC, 
such that we identify which S&P500 companies made contributions, to which candidates and 
what the contribution values were. We use exact name matching. Third, we manually search for 
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each S&P500 company name in the FPDS-NG database, in order to obtain information on the 
dollar amounts received in procurements by these companies. Again, we use exact name 
matching. We do not include subsidiary level data in our sample.  
 
The resulting sample consists of 911 unique S&P500 companies or 8,359 observations. The 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.1. We deleted 2 observations that reported negative 
dividends, 4 observations that reported negative sales, 325 observations that reported negative 
equity and 51 observations that reported total dividends higher than total assets.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the sample of 911 unique S&P500 companies in the time frame 1993-2010 
  Mean Min Median Max St dev 
Procurement 85,200,000 0 0 33,600,000,000 973,000,000 
Procurement (% of Assets) 0.52 0 0 107.31 4.18 
Log(1+Procurement) 5.92 0 0 24.24 7.42 
Contribution 49,593 0 0 2,186,800 121,710 
Contribution (% of Assets) 0.0003 0 0 0.04 0.001 
Log(1+Contribution) 5.14 0 0 14.60 5.44 
No. supported candidates 26.86 0 0 513 50.44 
% Democrats 17.72 0 0 100 23.10 
% Republicans 30.32 0 0 100 34.47 
 
     
LogAssets 22.91 18.21 22.80 28.45 1.41 
LogBM -1.00 -6.72 -0.95 12.21 0.82 
Debt/Assets 0.24 0 0.24 0.96 0.16 
Dividends/Assets 0.02 0 0.01 0.61 0.03 
Capex/Sales 0.08 0 0.05 1.69 0.11 
Cogs/Sales 0.61 0.01 0.65 10.52 0.24 
 
 
Table 4.1 shows that, on average, the S&P500 companies in our sample contribute to 27 
candidates or approximately $50,000, meaning that on average they contribute ~ $1,852 per 
candidate (i.e., below the limit of $5,000 per candidate per election) and they receive 
approximately $85 million in procurements. Predominantly, they support the Republican Party.  
 
In Figure 4.1, we display the evolution of the average procurement value and the average 
contribution value per year during the time period 1993-2010. The vertical lines mark the two-
year periods of the election cycles. Both the contribution values and the procurement values 
show strongly increasing trends, especially after 1999. It seems that the contributions follow the 
pattern of the election cycles: they decrease in the first year of an election cycle and then they 
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spike in the year right before the election, suggesting that contributions are essential close to the 
actual election. From 2005 onwards, the values track each other very closely.  
 
Figure 4.1: The evolution of the average procurement value and the average contribution value per company 
per year from 1993 until 2010; the vertical lines mark election dates 
 
 
Since 1999, both the average procurement and the average contribution per company almost 
doubled in value, suggesting that S&P500 companies invest more in election campaigns, but they 
also gain more in government contracts. However, the increase in procurements obtained by the 
S&P500 companies is not nearly as spectacular as the increase in the total procurements 
awarded at federal level. Figure 4.2 plots this increase on a yearly basis from 1993 until 2010. 
From 1999 until 2010, the total procurements awarded by the US government almost tripled in 
value. In 1993, the procurements awarded to S&P500 companies alone represented 19% of the 
total. Throughout the years, the percentage decreased, ending up at 15% in 2010.  
 
Figure 4.2: The evolution of the total procurement value at national level and the total procurement value 
allocated to S&P500 companies per year from 1993 until 2010 
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We continue the description of data with Figure 4.3, which shows the percentage of S&P500 
companies contributing to election campaigns and the percentage of S&P500 companies actually 
receiving procurement contracts. It seems that roughly 50% of the sample makes contributions 
every year, with the overwhelming majority of contributors giving to both the Democrats and 
the Republicans. Approximately 40% of the sample receives procurement contracts every year.  
 
Figure 4.3: The evolution of the percentage of S&P500 companies contributing to congressional elections, 
contributing to both Democrats and Republicans and receiving procurement contracts from 1993 until 2010 
 
 
We use the Fama-French 10 industry classification to learn more about the type of companies in 
our sample. Details of the Fama-French 10 industry classification can be found in Appendix Table 
4.1. In the entire sample, on average 22% of companies contribute to election campaigns and 
receive procurement contracts. The vast majority of the companies with these characteristics 
belong to the Manufacturing industry. 17% of the companies in our sample receive government 
contracts without making any contribution, in particular companies from the HiTech industry. 
27% contribute but do not receive procurements, while 34% do not engage in contributing nor 
do they contract procurements. These last two categories belong to the industry denoted Other 
in the Fama-French classification, which includes activities such as mining, constructions, 
transportation, bus services, entertainment or finance. 
 
 
4.3. Empirical analysis and results  
 
In this section we show that corporate political contributions have an influence on the 
subsequent procurement values that S&P500 companies receive and that these effects are 
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that in some industries contributions are indeed a tool in the competition among firms for 
procurements, while in others, they serve a different purpose, which could be for instance a type 
of insurance against unfavorable legislation.   
 
4.3.1. Corporate political contributions and subsequent procurement contracts 
 
We start our analysis by investigating the general relationship between corporate political 
contributions and procurement contracts. Even though it is difficult to disentangle the timing of 
contributions and procurements (i.e., whether a contribution is followed by a procurement or 
the other way around), we argue that the only reason a firm would contribute after receiving 
procurements is to secure future benefits. Thus, our main interest is not whether a firm received 
procurements in the past or not, but whether or not continuing to contribute affects future 
procurements.  
 
First, we determine how a contribution in the previous time period influences the likelihood of 
receiving a procurement contract in the current time period. To this end, we run a pooled Logit 
model. We are aware of potential endogeneity issues, which is why we instrument the 
contributions variable with lagged contributions (where one lag represents one year) and we try 
to limit the possibility of an omitted variable bias by controlling for industry differences and 
company characteristics.  
 
All regressions include industry dummies, constructed with the Fama-French 10 industries 
classification, and year dummies. Furthermore, the control variables used are in line with 
previous literature, such as Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), Goldman et al. (2013) or Tahoun 
(2014). In unreported results, we try three different proxies for the size of a company: the 
logarithm of total assets, the logarithm of total sales and the logarithm of market capitalization. 
The results remain the same regardless of the specification. We also include changes from period 
t-1 to period t in total assets, total sales and total market capitalization instead of the values at a 
given time point, without it altering our results in any way. Given that the key results are not 
influenced by the choice of size proxy, we use only the logarithm of total assets in subsequent 
analyses. Finally, we construct a Herfindhal-Hirschman Index ranging from 0 to 1 based on the 
total sales of all firms in industry j at time t, but the index coefficient is statistically insignificant 
in all regressions and we remove it from subsequent analyses. 
 
The results are displayed in Table 4.2. In Column (1), we regress Dproci,t, a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 if firm i receives a procurement contract in time period t and 0  
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Table 4.2: Pooled Logit regressions with industry and year dummies.  
  DProci,t   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DContribi,t-1 
 
DRepublicani,t-1 
0.676*** 
(5.76) 
 
 
0.605*** 
 
 
-0.108 
 
  (4.73) (-0.87)  
DRepublicans&Democratsi,t-1  0.704***   
  (5.79)   
DDemocrati,t-1 
 
Log(1+Contrib)i,t-1 
 
LogAssetsi,t 
 
 
 
 
0.031 
 
 
 
 
0.036 
-0.730*** 
(-5.94) 
 
 
0.031 
 
 
0.066*** 
(5.98) 
0.008 
 (0.55) (0.65) (0.55) (0.14) 
LogBMi,t -0.190** -0.193** -0.191** -0.188** 
 (-2.31) (-2.35) (-2.33) (-2.29) 
Debt/Assetsi,t 0.209 0.203 0.211 0.233 
 (0.52) (0.51) (0.53) (0.58) 
Dividends/Assetsi,t -3.389 -3.420 -3.508 -3.764 
 (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.40) (-1.45) 
Capex/Salesi,t -2.023*** -1.974*** -1.989*** -2.050*** 
 (-2.70) (-2.62) (-2.63) (-2.71) 
Cogs/Salesi,t -0.039 -0.018 -0.021 -0.055 
 (-0.13) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.18) 
Constant -0.936 -0.918 -0.076 -0.402 
 (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.05) (-0.29) 
 
FF 10 industry dummies 
Year dummies 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 
Pseudo-R2 
 
Odds of a procurement due to 
a contribution 
7,368 
0.114 
 
1.966 
7,368 
0.112 
 
1.830 
2.022 
7,368 
0.113 
 
0.897 
0.482 
7,368 
0.115 
 
1.068 
Note: DProci,t is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if company i receives a procurement contract at 
time t and 0 otherwise. DContribi,t-1 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if company i makes a 
contribution at time t-1 and 0 otherwise. DRepublicani,t-1 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if firm i 
makes at least 61% of contributions to the Republican Party and the rest to the Democratic Party and 0 
otherwise. DRepublicans&Democratsi,t-1 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if firm i contributes 
between 40% and 60% to the Republicans and the rest to the Democrats and 0 otherwise. DDemocrati,t-1 is a  
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if firm i contributes less than 40% to the Republicans and the rest to 
the Democrats and 0 otherwise. Log(1+Contrib)i,t-1 is the logarithm of 1 plus the total contribution value of 
firm i at time t-1. The control variables are defined in Appendix Table 4.2. The z-statistics are in parentheses. 
We cluster the standard errors at the firm level11.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Following Petersen (2009), we correct the standard errors for clustering effects. We cluster the standard errors at 
firm level and include time dummies as an alternative to double-clustering, as suggested by Thompson (2011).   
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otherwise, on Dcontribi,t-1, a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if firm i makes a political 
contribution in time period t-1 and 0 otherwise, and a set of control variables. The coefficient on 
the lagged dummy variable for having made a contribution is positive and statistically 
significant. We interpret odds ratios and conclude that making a contribution in the previous 
time period almost doubles a company’s chances of receiving a procurement contract in the 
current time period.  
 
In Columns (2) and (3), we decompose the contributions variable depending on the allocation of 
contributions between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. DRepublicani,t-1 is a 
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if firm i makes at least 61% of contributions to the 
Republican Party and the rest to the Democratic Party and 0 otherwise. 
DRepublicans&Democratsi,t-1 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if firm i contributes 
between 40% and 60% to the Republicans and the rest to the Democrats and 0 otherwise. This 
dummy variable captures in fact the firms contributing almost equally to both parties. 
DDemocrati,t-1 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if firm i contributes less than 40% to 
the Republicans and the rest to the Democrats and 0 otherwise.  
 
Column (2) of Table 4.2 shows that, relative to making most contributions to the Democrats, 
contributing to the Republican Party or approximately equal to both parties doubles the chances 
a company has to receive a procurement contract in the future. Similarly, Column (3) shows that, 
relative to contributing equal to both parties, contributing to the Republicans is not statistically 
different, but making most contributions to the Democrats actually decreases a company’s 
chances of receiving a government contract in the future. We know from Figure 4.2 that the vast 
majority of contributing S&P500 companies actually contributes to both parties, but it seems 
that they would be equally well-off by just contributing to the Republican Party.  
 
In Column (4) of Table 4.2, we investigate how the actual amount an S&P500 company 
contributes to an election campaign in the previous time period influences the likelihood of that 
company receiving a procurement contract in the current time period. We regress DProci,t on 
Log(1+Contrib)i,t-1, which is the logarithm of 1 plus the total contribution value per firm. The 
coefficient of Log(1+Contrib)i,t-1 is positive and statistically significant, but when we look at the 
odds ratio we realize that a higher amount does not considerably increase the chances of 
receiving a procurement in the future. If we compare this result to the result in Column (1) of 
Table 4.2, we can say that it is not how much but the mere fact that it contributes to election 
campaigns, which increases a company’s chances of receiving a government contract in the 
future. Given that contributions are limited to a maximum of $5,000 per candidate per election 
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and companies cannot compete in contribution amounts, it is possible that contributions act 
only as a signal that companies send to the government to express their interest in the process of 
allocating procurements.  
 
The statistically significant control variables in Table 4.2 are LogBMi,t and Capex/Salesi,t, both 
with a negative sign, suggesting that mature, overvalued companies, with less potential for 
future benefits from capital expenditures are more likely to receive government contracts. These 
results are in line with previous literature, such as Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), Goldman et 
al. (2013) or Tahoun (2014), and they are consistent throughout the remainder of the paper. 
Unlike previous literature, the size variable LogAssetsi,t is insignificant in our analysis, but this is 
likely due to the fact that all the companies in our sample are S&P500 companies, hence large 
companies.  
 
Second, we quantify the relationship between making a corporate political contribution and the 
subsequent dollar amount received in the form of a procurement contract. We do this using a 
Tobit model, because the dependent variable is censored at zero (a company receives either a 
positive value in the form of a procurement contract or zero). We regress the logarithm of 1 plus 
the total value of the procurement contract on three different measures of political contributions 
and a set of control variables.  
 
The results are presented in Table 4.3. In Columns (1) through (3), we use as contribution 
variables the logarithm of 1 plus the total contribution value per firm, the logarithm of 1 plus the 
number of candidates and the logarithm of 1 plus the total company contribution value per 
candidate, respectively. The coefficients of all these variables are positive and statistically 
significant. To interpret the magnitude of the effects, we compute marginal effects at the mean, 
which show that a 1% increase in the total contribution value a firm makes leads to a 0.239% 
increase in the total procurement value the firm subsequently receives. This means that, for a 
hypothetical firm with contributions and procurements equal to the sample average, an extra 
$495.93 (1% * 49,593) in average contribution brings an extra $203,628 (0.239% * 85,200,000) 
in average procurement value. Similarly, a 1% increase in the supported number of candidates 
or in the contribution value per candidate leads to a 0.721% and a 0.331% increase in the 
subsequent procurement value, respectively. Contributing to 1 extra candidate, which is roughly 
a 4% increase in the average number of candidates a company supports (4% * 26.86), brings an 
extra ~ $2.5 million in average procurement value (0.721% * 4 * 85,200,000). These 
procurement values seem very large, but one must take into account the fact that they represent 
revenues, not profits.  
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Table 4.3: Pooled Tobit regressions with industry and year dummies.  
  Log(1+Proc)i,t  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log(1+Contrib)i,t-1 0.522***   
 (6.37)   
Log(1+Candidates)i,t-1 
 
Log(1+Contrib/Candidates)i,t-1 
 
LogAssetsi,t 
 
 
 
 
0.264 
1.576*** 
(6.69) 
 
 
0.033 
 
 
0.724*** 
(6.03) 
0.439 
 (0.62) (0.08) (1.03) 
LogBMi,t -1.481*** -1.431*** -1.516*** 
 (-2.78) (-2.69) (-2.83) 
Debt/Assetsi,t 2.983 3.314 2.781 
 (0.98) (1.09) (0.90) 
Dividends/Assetsi,t -27.857 -31.660* -25.383 
 (-1.51) (-1.70) (-1.39) 
Capex/Salesi,t -16.680*** -16.727*** -16.547*** 
 (-2.97) (-2.95) (-2.95) 
Cogs/Salesi,t 1.581 1.565 1.647 
 (0.81) (0.81) (0.84) 
Constant -7.094 -1.315 -11.209 
 (-0.69) (-0.13) (-1.09) 
 
FF 10 industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year dummies 
Observations 
Pseudo-R2 
 
Marginal effect at the mean of contribution  
variables on procurement value 
Yes 
7,368 
0.042 
 
0.239 
 
Yes 
7,368 
0.043 
 
0.721 
 
Yes 
7,368 
0.042 
 
0.331 
 
Note: Log(1+Proc)i,t is the logarithm of 1 plus the total procurement value of firm i at time t. 
Log(1+Contrib)i,t-1 is the logarithm of 1 plus the total contribution value of firm i at time t-1. 
Log(1+Candidates)i,t-1 is the logarithm of 1 plus the total number of candidates company i supports at time t-
1. Log(1+Contrib/Candidates)i,t-1 is the logarithm of 1 plus the total contribution value per candidate of 
company i at time t-1. The control variables are defined in Appendix Table 4.2. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. We cluster the standard errors at firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Third, we look at the evolution of the relationship between making a contribution and receiving 
procurement contracts throughout the election cycles.  We re-run the specification in Column 
(1) of Table 4.3 per election cycle and present the results in Table 4.4. The effect of contributions 
on the subsequent procurement value is positive and statistically significant in all election 
cycles. There appears to be a persistent reciprocal relationship between contributing S&P500 
companies and the government in its capacity to allocate procurement contracts.  
 
The marginal effect at the mean progressively decreases in value until election cycle 1999-2000 
and afterwards it becomes increasingly more economically significant, a pattern which coincides 
with the evolution of the average procurement value in Figure 4.1 and the total procurement 
value in Figure 4.2. The year 2000 seems to represent a structural break in the data, but it is 
unclear why. In unreported results, we test for this by splitting the sample in two time periods: 
1993-2000 and 2001-2010. However, the effect contributions have on the subsequent 
procurement value is the same in both time periods. 
 
So far, the results suggest that the most profitable strategy for companies (i.e., the strategy that 
maximizes the future procurement value) is to contribute to a large number of candidates taking 
part in Congressional races and preferably to candidates of the Republican Party. It must be 
noted though that our sample is characterized by a large percentage of repeat contributors. One 
reason could be that they are driven by ideological beliefs. However, the vast majority of the 
contributing firms contribute to both the Democratic and the Republican Party, ruling out the 
political convictions hypothesis. In fact, the act of contributing to both parties could be 
assimilated to an imperfect hedge against political decisions. We argue that the S&P500 
companies contribute repeatedly with the intention to secure future benefits, either in the shape 
of government contracts or as favorable legislation. We also argue that the decision to contribute 
with the intention to receive government contracts and the decision to contribute with the 
intention to ensure against unfavorable legislation are two distinct choices, which depend on the 
type of industry the firm belongs to. The next subsection will go more into detail with this issue 
and will show that this is likely to be the case.  
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Table 4.4: Pooled Tobit regressions with industry dummies by election cycle.  
    Log(1+Proc)i,t      
 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 
          
Log(1+Contrib)i,t-1 0.806*** 0.707*** 0.600*** 0.343** 0.431*** 0.388*** 0.526*** 0.653*** 0.498*** 
 (4.40) (4.67) (3.98) (2.47) (3.07) (3.10) (4.17) (5.17) (3.89) 
LogAssetsi,t 0.493 0.051 -0.283 -0.140 0.142 0.368 -0.338 0.347 0.762 
 (0.67) (0.08) (-0.42) (-0.21) (0.22) (0.59) (-0.53) (0.61) (1.20) 
LogBMi,t -4.276** -5.075*** -1.014 -2.817*** -1.843* -1.656 -0.098 -0.539 -2.510** 
 (-2.27) (-3.32) (-0.85) (-2.79) (-1.77) (-1.44) (-0.08) (-1.06) (-2.03) 
Debt/Assetsi,t 8.283 2.507 4.573 7.664 7.362 2.394 -3.949 4.952 5.347 
 (1.33) (0.45) (0.82) (1.50) (1.49) (0.51) (-0.88) (1.33) (1.10) 
Dividends/Assetsi,t -57.860 -49.712 -42.638 -79.909** -69.216 18.748 -10.212 -7.339 -52.381 
 (-1.46) (-1.35) (-1.18) (-2.02) (-1.38) (0.43) (-0.29) (-0.49) (-1.63) 
Capex/Salesi,t -31.282** -23.046* -27.173*** -4.161 -19.704** -9.408 -18.809* -18.388** -11.003 
 (-2.29) (-1.80) (-2.63) (-0.49) (-2.07) (-0.73) (-1.66) (-2.31) (-1.09) 
Cogs/Salesi,t -1.518 2.557 2.153 8.483* 7.526* 6.971* 4.060 -2.112 -4.445 
 (-0.24) (0.44) (0.43) (1.70) (1.81) (1.71) (1.10) (-0.77) (-1.21) 
Constant -12.218 -7.571 6.638 -2.688 -13.934 -16.394 4.886 -13.150 -23.653 
 (-0.69) (-0.48) (0.41) (-0.17) (-0.90) (-1.12) (0.31) (-0.94) (-1.45) 
 
FF 10 industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 
Pseudo-R2 
 
Marginal effect at the 
mean of contributions  
on procurement value 
427 
0.080 
 
0.310 
853 
0.068 
 
0.283 
826 
0.053 
 
0.229 
809 
0.038 
 
0.148 
838 
0.038 
 
0.191 
869 
0.038 
 
0.194 
917 
0.045 
 
0.263 
900 
0.050 
 
0.329 
929 
0.036 
 
0.241 
Note: Log(1+Proc)i,t is the logarithm of 1 plus the total procurement value of firm i at time t. Log(1+Contrib) i,t-1 is the logarithm of 1 plus the total contribution value of 
firm i at time t-1. The control variables are defined in Appendix Table 4.2. The t-statistics are in parentheses. We cluster the standard errors at firm level. *** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.3.2. Industry-specific effects 
 
We learned from the results in the previous subsection that the level of corporate political 
contributions influences the size of procurement contracts and that the effects are persistent 
over time. We now argue that the importance of contributions in obtaining procurement 
contracts is different from one industry to another.   
 
Before formally testing our hypothesis, we analyze some descriptive statistics at the industry 
level. Table 4.5 shows the percentage of S&P500 companies that on average participate in the 
contributions process (i.e., Contributors) and whether or not these companies receive 
procurement contracts (i.e., Recipients). We use the Fama-French 10 industry classification as 
described in Appendix Table 4.1. The reference point of the table is the column Recipients 
Contributors, where the values are ranked from highest to lowest.  
 
In line with our previous results, Table 4.5 shows that in all industries, except for HiTech and 
Shops, contributors receive on average more procurements than non-contributors, suggesting 
that contributions could play a role in the allocation of government contracts. However, when 
comparing the Recipients Contributors and the Non-recipients Contributors columns of Table 
4.5, we observe some heterogeneity at the contributions/procurements level. In industries such 
as Utilities, Shops, Energy and Other, the percentage of contributors which do not receive 
procurements is higher than the percentage of contributors which receive procurements, 
suggesting that in these industries the purpose of contributions is not necessarily the 
maximization of the future procurement value. This leads us to believe that the firms in these 
industries could be receiving another type of benefit out of their political contributions instead 
of procurement contracts.  
 
We now test our hypothesis that the effects of corporate political contributions vary from one 
industry to another by running the pooled Tobit model of Table 4.3 for each industry in the 
Fama-French 10 industry classification. The results are displayed in Table 4.6. The industries are 
ordered from highest to lowest based on the magnitude of the marginal effect at the mean of 
contributions on procurement values.  
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Table 4.5: The percentages of S&P500 companies contributing to election campaigns (i.e., Contributors) and 
receiving procurement contracts (i.e., Recipients) in each of the Fama-French 10 industries 
  Recipients Non-recipients 
Fama French 10 industries Contributors Non-contributors Contributors  Non-contributors 
Healthcare 38% 20% 22% 20% 
Durables 35% 13% 24% 27% 
Manufacturing 34% 21% 18% 27% 
Telecommunications 29% 20% 19% 31% 
HiTech 25% 39% 8% 28% 
Nondurables 23% 15% 18% 44% 
Utilities 20% 5% 40% 35% 
Shops 14% 16% 29% 41% 
Energy 14% 12% 39% 36% 
Other 12% 9% 38% 40% 
 
 
As expected, the magnitudes of the effects differ across industries. The largest marginal effect at 
the mean is in the Durables industry. There, contributions seem to be most effective in 
increasing the procurement value in the next period. In some industries we find no effect at all. 
In the industries classified as Healthcare, Shops and Energy the effect of corporate political 
contributions on the subsequent value of government procurements is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that, if contributions are made, their purpose is not to increase the procurement 
value in the next period. We think that the more likely explanation is that contributions are 
meant to ensure that politicians will not adopt any unfavorable changes in legislation.  
 
This is also in line with the findings of Table 4.5, which shows that in some industries there are 
more contributors who do not receive procurements than there are contributors successful at 
being awarded procurements. The best example is the Energy sector, which is highly regulated 
in the US. In the entire sample, 53% of all the companies in this industry contribute to election 
campaigns, but only 14% receive government contracts, the remaining 39% perhaps making 
sure that they have a politician’s ear when it comes to regulation in the field. It is surprising 
though that in the Healthcare industry the result is statistically insignificant, considering the 
numbers in Table 4.5. However, it could be argued that, if as many as 60% of the companies in 
the industry contribute to election campaigns and 38% of those receive procurements even 
though past contributions do not have any influence on procurements, then the contributions 
must be meant for a different purpose. As stated earlier, we argue that this purpose is most 
likely favorable legislation and not ideological beliefs otherwise the vast majority of S&P500 
companies would not be consistently contributing to both the Republicans and the Democrats.  
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Table 4.6: Pooled Tobit regressions with year dummies per industry. 
     Log(1+Proc)i,t      
 Durables HiTech Telecom Manufacturing Nondurables Utilities Other Healthcare Shops Energy 
           
Log(1+Contrib)i,t-1 0.901** 0.548*** 0.586*** 0.536*** 0.814*** 1.067*** 0.508** 0.131 -0.091 -0.321 
 (2.28) (2.88) (3.23) (2.90) (3.06) (3.38) (2.42) (0.58) (-0.39) (-0.71) 
LogAssetsi,t 4.277** 0.155 1.748 2.450** -0.106 0.396 -2.131** 0.619 2.510 6.451** 
 (2.45) (0.17) (1.31) (2.42) (-0.08) (0.14) (-2.09) (0.53) (1.64) (2.23) 
LogBMi,t -1.510 0.175 -0.257 -2.259* -8.533*** 1.177 -3.136* 0.379 -0.987 -2.193 
 (-0.52) (0.24) (-0.32) (-1.75) (-4.67) (1.17) (-1.92) (0.19) (-0.55) (-0.51) 
Debt/Assetsi,t -17.814 4.983 16.078* -8.900 9.420 -29.717 9.525 2.109 -0.520 -36.985** 
 (-1.31) (0.87) (1.77) (-1.16) (0.95) (-1.26) (1.48) (0.21) (-0.06) (-2.18) 
Dividends/Assetsi,t 11.171 -60.699 95.581 -174.206** -137.166*** 4.173 -24.309 4.799 63.554 -405.981 
 (0.06) (-1.18) (1.51) (-2.36) (-3.79) (0.02) (-0.54) (0.15) (0.93) (-1.30) 
Capex/Salesi,t -163.794*** -37.299*** -12.356 -42.886 63.922 28.227* 13.614 13.900 -160.256*** -47.892*** 
 (-3.12) (-2.73) (-0.61) (-1.47) (0.76) (1.67) (0.95) (0.46) (-3.07) (-3.62) 
Cogs/Salesi,t -9.543 -6.535* -26.472** -1.583 46.046*** 20.317 -3.473 -12.581 16.689 10.040 
 (-0.38) (-1.77) (-2.17) (-0.18) (5.45) (1.11) (-0.63) (-1.57) (1.24) (0.67) 
Constant -93.075** 5.836 -37.054 -49.586** -33.226 -39.869 37.710 -4.650 -68.123* -155.637** 
 (-2.34) (0.28) (-1.16) (-2.07) (-1.17) (-0.52) (1.50) (-0.16) (-1.96) (-2.47) 
 
Year dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 
Pseudo-R2 
 
Marginal effect of 
contributions on 
procurement value 
201 
0.073 
 
0.531 
1,139 
0.017 
 
0.416 
246 
0.066 
 
0.353 
1,327 
0.029 
 
0.339 
587 
0.099 
 
0.325 
573 
0.032 
 
0.269 
1,573 
0.024 
 
0.112 
 
 
494 
0.016 
 
0.089 
845 
0.064 
 
-0.028 
383 
0.103 
 
-0.057 
Note: Log(1+Proc)i,t is the logarithm of 1 plus the total procurement value of firm i at time t. Log(1+Contrib) i,t-1 is the logarithm of 1 plus the total contribution value of 
firm i at time t-1. The control variables are defined in Appendix Table 4.2. The t-statistics are in parentheses. The standard errors clustered at firm level. *** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4.4. Conclusion 
  
This paper establishes a clear connection between corporate political contributions and the 
allocation of government procurement contracts. We gather information on all S&P500 companies, 
the contributions they make to Congressional election campaigns and the government 
procurements they receive in the time period 1993 – 2010, covering full Congressional election 
cycles.  
 
We find that making a contribution can increase a firm’s chances of subsequently receiving a 
procurement contract, with a larger contribution leading to a larger procurement value. To 
maximize the future procurement value, companies should contribute to a large number of 
candidates taking part in Congressional races, preferably from the Republican Party. Furthermore, 
we find that the effects of contributions are persistent over time and that they vary depending on 
the industry a firm belongs to.  
 
A most interesting finding is that contributions influence procurements differently in different 
industries. For the industries where we find a positive and statistically significant effect, we argue 
that firms can indeed use contributions as a tool in the competition with other firms for 
government contracts. For the industries where we find no effect on the subsequent procurement 
value, we propose the alternative explanation that perhaps the contributions act as insurance 
against unfavorable legislation.  
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4.5. Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 4.1: The composition of the Fama-French 10 industries 
Industry Composition 
Durables Cars, TV's, furniture, household appliances 
Energy Oil, gas and coal extraction and products 
Health Healthcare, medical equipment and drugs 
HiTech Computers, software and electronic equipment 
Manufacturing Machinery, trucks, planes, chemicals, furnaces, paper, printing 
Nondurables Food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, leather, toys 
Other Mines, constructions, building materials, transportation, hotels, bus services, entertainment, finance 
Shops Wholesale, retail and some services (laundries, repair shops) 
Telecom Telephone and television transmission 
Utilities Electric, gas and water services 
 
 
Appendix Table 4.2: The description of the control variables used in Tables 4.2 – 4.4 and 4.6. 
Variable Description 
LogAssetsi,t The logarithm of the total assets of company i at time t. Source: Compustat.  
LogBMi,t The logarithm of the book-to-market ratio of company i at time t. Source: Compustat. 
Debt/Assetsi,t The total debt value of company i scaled by the company’s total assets at time t. Source: 
Compustat. 
Dividends/Assetsi,t The total dividends paid by company i scaled by the company’s total assets at time t. 
Source: Compustat. 
Capex/Salesi,t The capital expenditures of company i scaled by the company’s total sales at time t. 
Source: Compustat. 
Cogs/Salesi,t The cost of goods sold of company i scaled by the company’s total sales at time t. 
Source: Compustat. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This dissertation is a collection of studies in the framework of incomplete markets. Most markets 
can be characterized as incomplete, at least at certain points in time, and this dissertation presents 
three different situations in which the market becomes incomplete due to the presence of non-
traded or infrequently traded assets.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the modifications to the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model needed in 
order to obtain closed-form solutions for European and American call options in incomplete 
markets, where the market is incomplete due to the presence of a non-traded or infrequently 
traded asset as the underlying asset of the option. The results show that there exists a negative 
relationship between the value of a European call option and the volatility of its underlying asset. 
Furthermore, this negative relationship adds an early exercise feature to an American call option 
even if the underlying asset is a non-dividend paying asset. This is due to the presence of 
unhedgeable sources of risk, additional to the hedgeable risk that we find on a complete market, 
eroding the option value.  
 
Chapter 3 explores the problem of pricing very long-dated cash flows, when the market is 
incomplete due to the presence of non-traded government bonds beyond maturities of 25 or 30 
years. In particular, chapter 3 documents a mispricing in the UK government bond market, the 
infinite maturity bond market, and shows that UK infinite maturity bonds are a cheap investment. 
These bonds are generally underpriced. The mispricing persists throughout the time period 2000-
2013 and it is mainly driven by volatility in the financial markets. Furthermore, the UK infinite 
maturity bonds can be a source of additional information regarding the term structure of interest 
rates as they imply a slightly upward term structure of interest rates beyond traded maturities.  
 
Chapter 4 analyzes the market for political risk. In this case, the fact that the market is incomplete 
determines a certain behavior in S&P500 companies. They make political contributions to the 
Democratic Party or to the Republican Party or to both in order to increase their chances of 
receiving benefits from the government either in the form of procurement contracts or potentially 
as favorable legislation.  
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Historical data shows that both campaign contributions and procurement values related to S&P500 
companies have an increasing trend in the time frame 1993-2010, suggesting that an investigation 
of the matter is not unwarranted. Furthermore, the documented effects of contributions vary 
depending on the industry the company belongs to. In some industries, for instance 
Telecommunications or HiTech, it appears that companies can use contributions as a tool in the 
competition for government contracts, while in others, for instance in Healthcare or Energy, 
contributions have no statistically significant effect, suggesting that the contributions’ purpose 
might be different in this case. An alternative explanation for the companies in the latter category 
might be that the political contributions are in fact directed at insuring against unfavorable 
legislation. 
 
All in all, the chapters in this dissertation analyze problems that are specific to incomplete markets 
and put forward potential solutions to these problems. They show that, in this situation, the prices 
of assets are no longer unique and that the best one can do is narrow down the possible solutions to 
a price interval. However, in order to derive closed-form solutions, one must accept the fact that 
these solutions are dependent on an exogenous restriction for which there are no clear guidelines 
on how to set it. Furthermore, the absence of certain traded assets, like government bonds, makes 
the discounting of long-dated cash flows very difficult and one must try to imply the necessary 
information from other traded long-dated financial instruments. However, if such instruments 
exist, they are usually characterized by a high degree of illiquidity. And, since incomplete markets 
are practically ubiquitous, one can also treat the market for political risk as an incomplete market. 
Here, the economic agents engage in a type of partial hedge in the hope of insuring against political 
risk by contributing to the election campaigns of candidates belonging to both the Democratic and 
the Republican parties, but unfortunately the result is the subsequent allocation of government 
money to the highest bidder and not necessarily the allocation of government money in the 
interests of the voters.   
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Knowledge valorization 
 
This section is an addendum to the dissertation, a collection of the author’s reflections regarding 
the topic of incomplete markets. In particular, this addendum discusses knowledge valorization (or 
the process of creating value from knowledge) in the context of the current dissertation.  
 
Academic work can be considered to be value adding if, apart from being scientifically relevant, it is 
also of social and/or economic relevance. Where finance is concerned, this means that the work is 
targeted at various stakeholders, from individuals and households to corporations and the society 
as a whole, in such a way that it highlights either shortcomings or opportunities not considered 
before, which would make these stakeholders significantly alter their course of action. Therefore, in 
order to discuss how this dissertation creates value from knowledge we must identify both the 
shortcomings or opportunities of each market setting presented and the corresponding 
stakeholders.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation have asset pricing implications for various types of investors. 
Chapter 2 describes a pricing mechanism in incomplete markets that is particularly interesting for 
retail or institutional investors who want to value real options. Real options represent future 
opportunities and are an important part of the capital budgeting decisions that firms are faced with. 
Better valuation techniques for real options can help a firm identify valuable projects and in turn 
lead to a better allocation of resources among projects. Ultimately, such decisions can be vital for 
the survival of a firm.      
 
Chapter 3 deals with the issue of discounting very long dated cash-flows. It brings into attention 
perhaps one of the most peculiar UK debt instruments: infinite maturity callable government 
bonds. The underlying problem is the discounting of cash flows with maturities longer than the 
longest maturity of traded instruments and the prices of bonds with infinite maturity could reveal 
valuable information on this matter. The stakeholders in this case are institutional investors, such 
as pension funds and insurance companies, because these are the type of investors with contractual 
obligations that last longer than any traded instrument in the market.  
 
The implications of Chapter 3 are of both economic and social nature and are relevant for the 
society as a whole, because the problem of discounting long-dated cash flows in fact extends to an 
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even bigger problem, that of the current pension crisis. Pension funds all over the world currently 
fear that they will soon not be able to meet their obligations. Apart from the social policies that 
governments must devise in order to improve the ratio of workers per retiree, this problem must 
also be tackled from a finance perspective by understanding exactly how underfunded pension 
funds are. To this end, one must discount the future obligations at the correct discount rate, which 
is something that is not known with certainty but that can be inferred for instance from market 
prices of instruments like the UK infinite maturity bonds.   
 
Chapter 4 targets the general public and it has both social and economic relevance. The chapter 
investigates whether or not the contributions that S&P500 companies make to election campaigns 
can increase their chances of subsequently receiving benefits from the government either in the 
form of procurement contracts or potentially as favorable legislation. There are several 
stakeholders in this case: various companies, the government, tax payers and their interests are not 
always aligned. The economic relevance of this topic lies in the fact that it opens up the discussion 
about whether or not the allocation of tax payer money is efficient and value adding given the 
increase in election campaign contributions over the years. The social aspect is represented by the 
fact that the topic questions whether or not an important part of how our society functions - the 
election system – was corrupted by the process of raising campaign contributions in the sense that 
contributors expect some form of compensation in return. The purpose of the chapter is not to give 
a definitive answer to these questions, but to raise awareness of the phenomenon among the 
general public and to encourage further research in the area.  
 
The topics in this dissertation are diverse and they open up many avenues for further research, 
especially since the related literature is not so vast. The ideas have already been shared with the 
general public at international conferences, like the 2012 World Congress of the Bachelier Finance 
Society in Sydney, the 2012 AsRES - AREUEA Joint International Conference in Singapore, the 2013 
ASTIN Colloquium of the International Actuarial Association in The Hague and the 2014 FMA 
Doctoral Student Consortium in Maastricht. It is the author’s hope that these ideas will materialize 
into academic journal publications. 
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